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Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco ONS15454, ONS15327, ONS15454SDH, and ONS15600 Nessus Vulnerabilities


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Date: Thu, 1 May 2003 09:00:00 -0700 (UTC)
From: Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team <psirt@cisco.com.>
To: [email protected]
Subject: Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco ONS15454, ONS15327, ONS15454SDH, and ONS15600 Nessus Vulnerabilities

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  Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco ONS15454, ONS15327, ONS15454SDH, and ONS15600
                             Nessus Vulnerabilities

Revision 1.0

  For Public Release 2003 May 01 at 1600 UTC (GMT)

     ----------------------------------------------------------------------

Contents

     Summary
     Affected Products
     Details
     Impact
     Software Versions and Fixes
     Obtaining Fixed Software
     Workarounds
     Exploitation and Public Announcements
     Status of This Notice: FINAL
     Distribution
     Revision History
     Cisco Security Procedures

     ----------------------------------------------------------------------


Summary

   Nessus exposes FTP and Telnet vulnerabilities in the Cisco ONS15454
   Optical Transport Platform, the Cisco ONS15327 Edge Optical Transport
   Platform, the Cisco ONS15454SDH Multiplexer Platform, and the Cisco
   ONS15600 Multiservice Switching Platform. Cisco ONS15454 hardware running
   ONS Releases 3.0 through Release 3.4.1, Cisco ONS15327 and ONS15454SDH
   hardware running ONS Releases 3.3 through Release 3.4.1, and Cisco
   ONS15600 hardware running ONS Release 1.0 is affected by these
   vulnerabilities. Nessus is a free security scanner software available from
   nessus.org.

   These vulnerabilities are documented as Cisco Bug IDs CSCdz83515 and
   CSCdz83519. There are workarounds available to mitigate the effects of
   these vulnerabilities.

   This advisory will be posted at
   http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20030501-ons.shtml.

Affected Products

     * Cisco ONS15454 hardware running ONS Releases 3.0 through Release 3.4.1


     * Cisco ONS15327 and Cisco ONS15454SDH hardware running ONS Releases 3.3
       through Release 3.4.1


     * Cisco ONS15600 hardware running ONS Release 1.0


   Products not affected by these vulnerabilities are listed below.

     * Cisco ONS15454 hardware running ONS Releases 4.0 and 2.x


     * Cisco ONS15327 hardware running ONS Release 4.0 and Release 1.x


     * Cisco ONS15454SDH hardware running ONS Release 4.0


   No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these
   vulnerabilities.

   To determine your software revision, view the Help > About window on the
   CTC network management software.

Details

   The affected Cisco ONS15454, ONS15327, ONS15454SDH, and ONS15600 hardware
   is managed via the TCC+, XTC, TCCi, and TSC control cards respectively.
   These control cards are usually connected to a network isolated from the
   Internet and local to the customer's environment. This limits the exposure
   to the exploitation of the vulnerabilities from the Internet.

   +------------------------------------------+
   |DDTS - Description|        Details        |
   |------------------+-----------------------|
   |                  |By making an invalid   |
   |                  |FTP request, a person  |
   |                  |may cause the TCC+,    |
   |CSCdz83515 - TCC+ |XTC, TCCi, or TSC      |
   |reboots on Nessus |control cards to reset.|
   |VxWorks FTP DoS   |Repeated invalid       |
   |script            |requests would cause   |
   |                  |both the control cards |
   |                  |to be reset at the same|
   |                  |time.                  |
   |------------------+-----------------------|
   |                  |By making an invalid   |
   |                  |Telnet request, a      |
   |                  |person may cause the   |
   |CSCdz83519 - TCC+ |TCC+, XTC, TCCi, or TSC|
   |reboots on Nessus |control cards to reset.|
   |VxWorks binlogin  |Repeated invalid       |
   |overflow script   |requests would cause   |
   |                  |both the control cards |
   |                  |to be reset at the same|
   |                  |time.                  |
   +------------------------------------------+

   These vulnerabilities are documented as Bug IDs CSCdz83515 and CSCdz83519.
   Details can be viewed after 2003 May 02 by accessing the Cisco Bug Toolkit

   The Internetworking Terms and Cisco Systems Acronyms online guides can be
   found at http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/cisintwk/.

Impact

   The timing for the data channels traversing the switch is provided by the
   control cards.

   On the Cisco ONS15454, ONS15327, and ONS15454SDH hardware platforms,
   whenever both the active and standby control cards are rebooting at the
   same time, the synchronous data channels traversing the switch drop
   traffic until the card reboots. Asynchronous data channels traversing the
   switch are not impacted. Manageability functions provided by the network
   element via the TCC+, XTC, and TCCi control cards are not available until
   the control card reboots.

   On the Cisco ONS15600 hardware platforms, whenever both the active and
   standby control cards are rebooting at the same time, there is no impact
   to the data channels traversing the switch because the TSC does a software
   reset which does not impact the timing being provided by the TSC for the
   data channels. Manageability functions provided by the network element via
   the TSC control cards are not available until the control card reboots.

Software Versions and Fixes

   All these vulnerabilities for the ONS15454, ONS15327, and ONS15454SDH
   platforms are fixed in the Cisco ONS software Releases 4.0 and later for
   the affected platforms.

   All these vulnerabilities for the ONS15600 platforms are fixed in the
   Cisco ONS software Release 1.1, which will be available in September 2003.

   Upgrade procedures can be found as indicated below.

     * The procedure to upgrade to the fixed software version on the Cisco
       ONS15454 hardware is detailed at
       http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/ong/15400/r40docs/sftupgrd/index.htm.


     * The procedure to upgrade to the fixed software version on the Cisco
       ONS15327 hardware is detailed at
       http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/ong/15327/327doc40/index.htm.


     * The procedure to upgrade to the fixed software version on the Cisco
       ONS1600 hardware is detailed at
       http://cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/ong/15600/index.htm.


Obtaining Fixed Software

   Cisco is offering free software upgrades to address these vulnerabilities
   for all affected customers. Customers may only install and expect support
   for the feature sets they have purchased.

   Customers with service contracts should contact their regular update
   channels to obtain the free software upgrade identified via this advisory.
   For most customers with service contracts, this means that upgrades should
   be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at
   http://www.cisco.com/tacpage/sw-center/sw-optical.shtml (registered
   customers only) .

   Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through a prior
   or existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as Cisco
   Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that
   support organization for assistance with obtaining the free software
   upgrade(s).

   Customers who purchased directly from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco
   service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors
   but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of
   sale, should obtain fixed software by contacting the Cisco Technical
   Assistance Center (TAC) using the contact information listed below. In
   these cases, customers are entitled to obtain an upgrade to a later
   version of the same release or as indicated by the applicable corrected
   software version in the Software Versions and Fixes section (noted above).

     * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)


     * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)


     * e-mail: [email protected]


   See http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml for
   additional TAC contact information, including special localized telephone
   numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various
   languages.

   Please have your product serial number available and give the URL of this
   advisory as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade.

   Please do not contact either "[email protected]" or
   "[email protected]" for software upgrades.

Workarounds

   The Cisco PSIRT recommends that affected users upgrade to a fixed software
   version of code as soon as possible.

   Use Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding and access control lists on routers
   and firewalls to allow only valid network management workstations gain FTP
   and Telnet access to the TCC+, XTC, TCCi, or TSC control cards.

Exploitation and Public Announcements

   The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use
   of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory.

   These vulnerabilities were reported to PSIRT by internal development
   testing and customers.

Status of This Notice: FINAL

   This is a final advisory. Although Cisco cannot guarantee the accuracy of
   all statements in this advisory, all of the facts have been checked to the
   best of our ability. Cisco does not anticipate issuing updated versions of
   this advisory unless there is some material change in the facts. Should
   there be a significant change in the facts, Cisco may update this
   advisory.

   A stand-alone copy or paraphrase of the text of this security advisory
   that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an
   uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual
   errors.

Distribution

   This advisory will be posted on Cisco's worldwide website at
   http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20030501-ons.shtml.

   In addition to worldwide website posting, a text version of this advisory
   is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key having the fingerprint 8C82
   5207 0CA9 ED40 1DD2 EE2A 7B31 A8CF 32B6 B590 and is posted to the
   following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.

     * [email protected]


     * [email protected]


     * [email protected] (includes CERT/CC)


     * [email protected]


     * [email protected]


     * [email protected]


     * [email protected]


     * [email protected]


     * Various internal Cisco mailing lists


   Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
   worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing
   lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to
   check the above URL for any updates.

Revision History

   +------------------------------------------+
   |Revision 1.0|2003-May-01|Initial public   |
   |            |           |release.         |
   +------------------------------------------+

Cisco Security Procedures

   Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
   products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to
   receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide
   website at
   http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/sec_incident_response.shtml. This
   includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security
   notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
   http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.

     ----------------------------------------------------------------------

   This notice is Copyright 2003 by Cisco Systems, Inc. This notice may be
   redistributed freely after the release date given at the top of the text,
   provided that redistributed copies are complete and unmodified, and
   include all date and version information.

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