Author: Haoxiang Li <[email protected]> Date: Mon Jun 1 01:08:04 2026 +0200 accessibility: speakup: unregister tty ldisc on later init failures commit a76acbaec9b8fd74413646984d2e3626d0543e39 upstream. The ldisc registration is intentionally non-fatal, since some synth drivers do not use tty/ldisc. However, once speakup_init() continues past the registration point and later fails, the init unwind path should mirror speakup_exit() and call spk_ttyio_unregister_ldisc(). Add the missing unregister call to the error path after synth_release(), matching the normal module exit cleanup order. Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault <[email protected]> Fixes: e23a9b439ce9 ("staging: speakup: safely register and unregister ldisc") Cc: [email protected] Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Mehul Rao <[email protected]> Date: Thu Mar 5 14:35:07 2026 -0500 ALSA: pcm: fix use-after-free on linked stream runtime in snd_pcm_drain() [ Upstream commit 9b1dbd69ba6f8f8c69bc7b77c2ce3b9c6ed05ba6 ] In the drain loop, the local variable 'runtime' is reassigned to a linked stream's runtime (runtime = s->runtime at line 2157). After releasing the stream lock at line 2169, the code accesses runtime->no_period_wakeup, runtime->rate, and runtime->buffer_size (lines 2170-2178) — all referencing the linked stream's runtime without any lock or refcount protecting its lifetime. A concurrent close() on the linked stream's fd triggers snd_pcm_release_substream() → snd_pcm_drop() → pcm_release_private() → snd_pcm_unlink() → snd_pcm_detach_substream() → kfree(runtime). No synchronization prevents kfree(runtime) from completing while the drain path dereferences the stale pointer. Fix by caching the needed runtime fields (no_period_wakeup, rate, buffer_size) into local variables while still holding the stream lock, and using the cached values after the lock is released. Fixes: f2b3614cefb6 ("ALSA: PCM - Don't check DMA time-out too shortly") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Mehul Rao <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Author: Ji'an Zhou <[email protected]> Date: Thu Jun 4 14:25:59 2026 +0000 ALSA: PCM: Fix wait queue list corruption in snd_pcm_drain() on linked streams [ Upstream commit 88fe2e3658726cb21ff2dcf9770bf672f9b9d31b ] snd_pcm_drain() uses init_waitqueue_entry which does not clear entry.prev/next, and add_wait_queue with a conditional remove_wait_queue that is skipped when to_check is no longer in the group after concurrent UNLINK. The orphaned wait entry remains on the unlinked substream sleep queue. On the next drain iteration, add_wait_queue adds the entry to a new queue while still linked on the old one, corrupting both lists. A subsequent wake_up dereferences NULL at the func pointer (mapped from the spinlock at offset 0 of the misinterpreted wait_queue_head_t), causing a kernel panic. Replace init_waitqueue_entry/add_wait_queue/conditional remove_wait_queue with init_wait_entry/prepare_to_wait/ finish_wait. init_wait_entry clears prev/next via INIT_LIST_HEAD on each iteration and sets autoremove_wake_function which auto-removes the entry on wake-up. finish_wait safely handles both the already-removed and still-queued cases. Fixes: 9b1dbd69ba6f ("ALSA: pcm: fix use-after-free on linked stream runtime in snd_pcm_drain") Signed-off-by: Ji'an Zhou <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Author: Oswald Buddenhagen <[email protected]> Date: Wed Apr 5 22:12:19 2023 +0200 ALSA: pcm: fix wait_time calculations [ Upstream commit 3ed2b549b39f57239aad50a255ece353997183fd ] ... in wait_for_avail() and snd_pcm_drain(). t was calculated in seconds, so it would be pretty much always zero, to be subsequently de-facto ignored due to being max(t, 10)'d. And then it (i.e., 10) would be treated as secs, which doesn't seem right. However, fixing it to properly calculate msecs would potentially cause timeouts when using twice the period size for the default timeout (which seems reasonable to me), so instead use the buffer size plus 10 percent to be on the safe side ... but that still seems insufficient, presumably because the hardware typically needs a moment to fire up. To compensate for this, we up the minimal timeout to 100ms, which is still two orders of magnitude less than the bogus minimum. substream->wait_time was also misinterpreted as jiffies, despite being documented as being in msecs. Only the soc/sof driver sets it - to 500, which looks very much like msecs were intended. Speaking of which, shouldn't snd_pcm_drain() also use substream-> wait_time? As a drive-by, make the debug messages on timeout less confusing. Signed-off-by: Oswald Buddenhagen <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Author: Will Porter <[email protected]> Date: Mon Aug 24 17:57:57 2026 -0500 ALSA: usb-audio: Complete cleanup after system-resume errors commit 1739a976312e110c93a8dee66a1cdf893a1b187e upstream. A failed system resume can leave the card unusable until reboot. usb_audio_resume() jumps to err_out when snd_usb_pcm_resume() or snd_usb_mixer_resume() fails. The error path skips the out: block, which restores D0 and decrements chip->num_suspended_intf. The card stays in SNDRV_CTL_POWER_D3hot, so later control access blocks in snd_power_ref_and_wait(). USB core logs an interface resume callback error. It does not retry that callback, so a later callback cannot complete the skipped cleanup. usb_audio_suspend() increments num_suspended_intf before returning success. A system-resume callback must consume the system-suspend count even if a component resume fails. Otherwise, the stranded count skews later suspend and resume cycles. Do not apply this cleanup to runtime-resume errors. Runtime PM can retry -EAGAIN or -EBUSY without another suspend callback. The count must continue to describe that suspended interface. Other runtime-resume errors latch runtime_error in the PM core and do not cause an immediate callback retry. Both parts of the system-resume error path are longstanding. Commit 88a8516a2128a ("ALSA: usbaudio: implement USB autosuspend") introduced err_out past the D0 restore. Commit 862b2509d157c ("ALSA: usb-audio: Fix inconsistent card PM state after resume") later moved num_suspended_intf-- into the out: block. The error path now skips both operations. No third-party code is needed to reach the error path. snd_usb_mixer_resume() ends in snd_usb_mixer_activate(), which returns the result of usb_submit_urb() for devices that have a mixer status URB. Its mixer->private_resume hook can also fail through scarlett2_init_notify(). snd_usb_pcm_resume() issues a SET_CUR request to a UAC3 power domain. It can return -EPIPE or -EIO when the device stalls the request. Route a component error through out: only when system_suspend is nonzero. Continue to return runtime-resume errors through err_out. Later component resume stages remain skipped. The original error still reaches USB core. A later transfer can fail if the device did not recover. I reproduced the system-resume failure on an Audient iD14 MkI with an out-of-tree diagnostic mixer resume hook. An injected -EIO on the unpatched core left control readers in uninterruptible sleep in snd_power_ref_and_wait() until a reboot. With this patch, the same failure restored control access. A second system suspend and resume also succeeded after I disabled fault injection. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5 Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.1-pro-high Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6-sol Fixes: 88a8516a2128a ("ALSA: usbaudio: implement USB autosuspend") Fixes: 862b2509d157c ("ALSA: usb-audio: Fix inconsistent card PM state after resume") Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Will Porter <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Marouane El Moufid <[email protected]> Date: Sun Aug 23 13:55:48 2026 +0000 ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in snd_usbmidi_novation_output() commit 1035a8f63bae28e498b0e7b5ac91d749844a7158 upstream. snd_usbmidi_novation_output() lays out a two-byte header at transfer_buffer[0..1] and passes &transfer_buffer[2] together with a length of ep->max_transfer - 2 to snd_rawmidi_transmit(): count = snd_rawmidi_transmit(ep->ports[0].substream, &transfer_buffer[2], ep->max_transfer - 2); ep->max_transfer comes from the output endpoint's wMaxPacketSize via usb_maxpacket(). A malformed or malicious device can advertise a bulk OUT endpoint with a wMaxPacketSize of 1 - the USB core only clamps this value downwards - so ep->max_transfer becomes 1 and the count argument becomes -1. snd_rawmidi_transmit() passes the negative count on to __snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek(), where "if (count1 > count) count1 = count" leaves count1 negative; get_aligned_size() keeps it negative for a byte-stream substream, so the following memcpy(buffer, ..., count1) runs with a (size_t)-1 length and writes far past the transfer buffer, which was allocated with usb_alloc_coherent(ep->max_transfer). This is the same class of bug that was fixed for snd_usbmidi_akai_output() in commit 0970274613fb ("ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in snd_usbmidi_akai_output()"); the novation output routine was left unguarded. Bail out when the endpoint cannot hold the two-byte header plus at least one payload byte. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Marouane El Moufid <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Jon Hunter <[email protected]> Date: Tue Jun 13 10:34:53 2023 +0100 ASoC: tegra: Fix Master Volume Control [ Upstream commit f9fd804aa0a36f15a35ca070ec4c52650876cc29 ] Commit 3ed2b549b39f ("ALSA: pcm: fix wait_time calculations") corrected the PCM wait_time calculations and in doing so reduced the calculated wait_time. This exposed an issue with the Tegra Master Volume Control (MVC) device where the reduced wait_time caused the MVC to fail. For now fix this by setting the default wait_time for Tegra to be 500ms. Fixes: 3ed2b549b39f ("ALSA: pcm: fix wait_time calculations") Signed-off-by: Jon Hunter <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Author: Jiayuan Chen <[email protected]> Date: Thu Apr 9 10:37:32 2026 +0800 bpf: Fix use-after-free in offloaded map/prog info fill [ Upstream commit a0c584fc18056709c8e047a82a6045d6c209f4ce ] When querying info for an offloaded BPF map or program, bpf_map_offload_info_fill_ns() and bpf_prog_offload_info_fill_ns() obtain the network namespace with get_net(dev_net(offmap->netdev)). However, the associated netdev's netns may be racing with teardown during netns destruction. If the netns refcount has already reached 0, get_net() performs a refcount_t increment on 0, triggering: refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. Although rtnl_lock and bpf_devs_lock ensure the netdev pointer remains valid, they cannot prevent the netns refcount from reaching zero. Fix this by using maybe_get_net() instead of get_net(). maybe_get_net() uses refcount_inc_not_zero() and returns NULL if the refcount is already zero, which causes ns_get_path_cb() to fail and the caller to return -ENOENT -- the correct behavior when the netns is being destroyed. Fixes: 675fc275a3a2d ("bpf: offload: report device information for offloaded programs") Fixes: 52775b33bb507 ("bpf: offload: report device information about offloaded maps") Reported-by: Yinhao Hu <[email protected]> Reported-by: Kaiyan Mei <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dongliang Mu <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <[email protected]> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Author: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]> Date: Wed Jul 10 16:16:31 2024 +0200 bpf: Remove tst_run from lwt_seg6local_prog_ops. [ Upstream commit c13fda93aca118b8e5cd202e339046728ee7dddb ] The syzbot reported that the lwt_seg6 related BPF ops can be invoked via bpf_test_run() without without entering input_action_end_bpf() first. Martin KaFai Lau said that self test for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_SEG6LOCAL probably didn't work since it was introduced in commit 04d4b274e2a ("ipv6: sr: Add seg6local action End.BPF"). The reason is that the per-CPU variable seg6_bpf_srh_states::srh is never assigned in the self test case but each BPF function expects it. Remove test_run for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_SEG6LOCAL. Suggested-by: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]> Reported-by: [email protected] Fixes: d1542d4ae4df ("seg6: Use nested-BH locking for seg6_bpf_srh_states.") Fixes: 004d4b274e2a ("ipv6: sr: Add seg6local action End.BPF") Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Author: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]> Date: Sat Sep 27 21:11:16 2025 +0900 can: j1939: add missing calls in NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification handler [ Upstream commit 93a27b5891b8194a8c083c9a80d2141d4bf47ba8 ] Currently NETDEV_UNREGISTER event handler is not calling j1939_cancel_active_session() and j1939_sk_queue_drop_all(). This will result in these calls being skipped when j1939_sk_release() is called. And I guess that the reason syzbot is still reporting unregister_netdevice: waiting for vcan0 to become free. Usage count = 2 is caused by lack of these calls. Calling j1939_cancel_active_session(priv, sk) from j1939_sk_release() can be covered by calling j1939_cancel_active_session(priv, NULL) from j1939_netdev_notify(). Calling j1939_sk_queue_drop_all() from j1939_sk_release() can be covered by calling j1939_sk_netdev_event_netdown() from j1939_netdev_notify(). Therefore, we can reuse j1939_cancel_active_session(priv, NULL) and j1939_sk_netdev_event_netdown(priv) for NETDEV_UNREGISTER event handler. Fixes: 7fcbe5b2c6a4 ("can: j1939: implement NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification handler") Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]> Tested-by: Oleksij Rempel <[email protected]> Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Author: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]> Date: Mon Aug 25 23:07:24 2025 +0900 can: j1939: implement NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification handler [ Upstream commit 7fcbe5b2c6a4b5407bf2241fdb71e0a390f6ab9a ] syzbot is reporting unregister_netdevice: waiting for vcan0 to become free. Usage count = 2 problem, for j1939 protocol did not have NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification handler for undoing changes made by j1939_sk_bind(). Commit 25fe97cb7620 ("can: j1939: move j1939_priv_put() into sk_destruct callback") expects that a call to j1939_priv_put() can be unconditionally delayed until j1939_sk_sock_destruct() is called. But we need to call j1939_priv_put() against an extra ref held by j1939_sk_bind() call (as a part of undoing changes made by j1939_sk_bind()) as soon as NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification fires (i.e. before j1939_sk_sock_destruct() is called via j1939_sk_release()). Otherwise, the extra ref on "struct j1939_priv" held by j1939_sk_bind() call prevents "struct net_device" from dropping the usage count to 1; making it impossible for unregister_netdevice() to continue. Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=881d65229ca4f9ae8c84 Tested-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Fixes: 25fe97cb7620 ("can: j1939: move j1939_priv_put() into sk_destruct callback") Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]> Tested-by: Oleksij Rempel <[email protected]> Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] [mkl: remove space in front of label] Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Author: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]> Date: Tue Nov 25 22:43:12 2025 +0900 can: j1939: make j1939_sk_bind() fail if device is no longer registered [ Upstream commit 46cea215dc9444ec32a76b1b6a9cb809e17b64d5 ] There is a theoretical race window in j1939_sk_netdev_event_unregister() where two j1939_sk_bind() calls jump in between read_unlock_bh() and lock_sock(). The assumption jsk->priv == priv can fail if the first j1939_sk_bind() call once made jsk->priv == NULL due to failed j1939_local_ecu_get() call and the second j1939_sk_bind() call again made jsk->priv != NULL due to successful j1939_local_ecu_get() call. Since the socket lock is held by both j1939_sk_netdev_event_unregister() and j1939_sk_bind(), checking ndev->reg_state with the socket lock held can reliably make the second j1939_sk_bind() call fail (and close this race window). Fixes: 7fcbe5b2c6a4 ("can: j1939: implement NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification handler") Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]> Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Author: Thorsten Blum <[email protected]> Date: Thu Jun 11 12:36:35 2026 +0200 crypto: atmel-tdes - use scatterlist length before DMA mapping commit ba199bdaa80b09a7dd92f28751de7f3dbb06c510 upstream. Using sg_dma_len() is only valid after mapping the scatterlist with dma_map_sg(). However, atmel_tdes_crypt_start() uses it before mapping to compare input/output lengths and to compute the transfer count. Use the original scatterlist lengths before DMA mapping to avoid reading stale or uninitialized DMA lengths when CONFIG_NEED_SG_DMA_LENGTH=y. Drop the output scatterlist length in the fast path since it is equal to ->in_sg->length and does not change the transfer count. Fixes: 13802005d8f2 ("crypto: atmel - add Atmel DES/TDES driver") Fixes: 1f858040c2f7 ("crypto: atmel-tdes - add support for latest release of the IP (0x700)") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Thorsten Blum <[email protected]> Date: Sun Jun 21 21:26:16 2026 +0200 crypto: mxs-dcp - fix source scatterlist length access commit c5bcb084a9871e5b62afb5f48b60adfa13b5d9f8 upstream. mxs_dcp_aes_block_crypt() uses sg_dma_len() without mapping the source scatterlist with dma_map_sg() first. Therefore, sg_dma_len() is invalid and could return zero or a stale DMA length, causing encryption and decryption to process the wrong number of bytes when CONFIG_NEED_SG_DMA_LENGTH=y. Use the original scatterlist length instead. Fixes: 15b59e7c3733 ("crypto: mxs - Add Freescale MXS DCP driver") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Frank Li <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Md Sadre Alam <[email protected]> Date: Fri Aug 7 12:24:54 2026 +0530 crypto: qce - fix CCM AAD buffer underallocation commit 7f2345f47dd189625f657cd72437179ab4170ee1 upstream. The AAD buffer allocated in qce_aead_ccm_prepare_buf_assoclen() can be smaller than the length later programmed into the DMA scatterlist. The allocation size is currently calculated as: ALIGN(assoclen, 16) + MAX_CCM_ADATA_HEADER_LEN while the DMA length is set to: ALIGN(assoclen + adata_header_len, 16) Since ALIGN() does not distribute over addition, the allocation can be smaller than the DMA length. For example, when assoclen = 32 and adata_header_len = 2: allocation = ALIGN(32, 16) + 6 = 38 DMA length = ALIGN(32 + 2, 16) = 48 As a result, the QCE hardware can read beyond the allocated buffer while computing the CBC-MAC over the associated data. The extra bytes are folded into the authentication tag, resulting in an incorrect tag and causing CCM self-test failures such as: alg: aead: ccm-aes-qce encryption test failed (wrong result) on test vector 8 Fix the allocation by adding the maximum possible AAD header length before alignment: ALIGN(assoclen + MAX_CCM_ADATA_HEADER_LEN, 16) This guarantees that the allocated buffer is large enough for the fully padded AAD data for all supported header sizes. Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 9363efb4181c ("crypto: qce - Add support for AEAD algorithms") Signed-off-by: Md Sadre Alam <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Bartosz Golaszewski <[email protected]> Date: Mon Jun 22 15:18:09 2026 +0200 crypto: qce - Remove unsafe/deprecated algorithms commit 7e28b0a5c4b7d075b98ce6d8f5290a9d3deb5b92 upstream. Remove algorithms that are either unsafe or deprecated and have no in-kernel users that cannot be served by the ARM CE implementations. AES-ECB reveals plaintext patterns (identical plaintext blocks produce identical ciphertext blocks) and should not be exposed as a hardware- accelerated primitive. DES, Triple DES and HMAC-SHA1 have been deprecated for years. Remove sha1, ecb(aes), ecb(des), cbc(des), ecb(des3_ede), cbc(des3_ede), hmac(sha1) and all AEAD variants built on these primitives as well as authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(des)). Also clean up the - now dead - code, flags and constants. Cc: [email protected] Acked-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> Tested-by: Kuldeep Singh <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> Date: Wed Aug 26 20:38:33 2026 -0700 ext4: don't enable DAX on new encrypted files commit da32af420d6d466e247c43ac0b829edeac7ae0ad upstream. Currently, when a new encrypted regular file is created, the call to ext4_set_inode_flags(inode, init=true) in __ext4_new_inode() is made before EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT is set. As a result, it can set S_DAX if the filesystem is mounted with "-o dax=always". EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT then actually gets set a bit later in __ext4_new_inode(), when it calls fscrypt_set_context() which calls ext4_set_context(). ext4_set_context() sets EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT and calls ext4_set_inode_flags(inode, init=false) to set S_ENCRYPTED too. This was intended to clear S_DAX as well. However, this was broken by commit 043546e46dc7 ("fs/ext4: Only change S_DAX on inode load"). This causes data written to the file to bypass encryption, also causing xfstests failures such as generic/548 (when "-o dax=always" is used). Fix this by simplifying the flow by making __ext4_new_inode() set EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT earlier. This makes it take effect in ext4_set_inode_flags(inode, init=true), making S_DAX never be set. Similarly, make EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA never be set in the first place on new encrypted inodes. Then it doesn't need to be cleared. As a result of these simplifications, ext4_set_context() no longer needs to change inode flags or state when 'handle != NULL'. Remove that too. Reported-by: Disha Goel <[email protected]> Reported-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 043546e46dc7 ("fs/ext4: Only change S_DAX on inode load") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> Tested-by: Disha Goel <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Author: Guanghui Yang <[email protected]> Date: Tue Aug 25 21:17:47 2026 -0400 ext4: propagate errors from fast commit range replay [ Upstream commit d8b8dd3530bf41e14b118702cdaf9de64bb96885 ] ext4_fc_replay() stops replaying fast commit tags only when a tag handler returns a negative error. However, ext4_fc_replay_add_range() and ext4_fc_replay_del_range() currently return 0 from their common exit paths even after internal failures. This hides errors from ext4_fc_record_modified_inode(), ext4_map_blocks(), ext4_find_extent(), ext4_ext_insert_extent(), ext4_ext_replay_update_ex(), and ext4_ext_remove_space(). As a result, a failed ADD_RANGE or DEL_RANGE replay can be treated as successful and the replay code may continue with subsequent fast commit tags. This is particularly problematic for DEL_RANGE because it may already have marked blocks as free before ext4_ext_remove_space() fails. If the error is swallowed, replay may continue from a partially applied range operation. Return the saved error from the common exit paths and make the ERR_PTR() cases in ADD_RANGE store PTR_ERR() before jumping to out. Fixes: 8016e29f4362 ("ext4: fast commit recovery path") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Guanghui Yang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> [ kept the existing `ext4_find_extent(inode, cur, NULL, 0)` call and dropped the `ext4_ext_insert_extent()` error-capture hunk, since this tree's extents API predates the ppath rework and already returns errors via `int` ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Griffin Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Date: Mon Jul 6 16:58:21 2026 +0200 fpga: dfl: fme: add error handling commit b5ba63e247075087ab8a6a087622c762dc4172e9 upstream. Add error handling to devm_kasprint in fme_perf_pmu_register(). Assisted-by: gkh_clanker_2000 Fixes: 724142f8c42a ("fpga: dfl: fme: add performance reporting support") Cc: [email protected] Cc: Xu Yilun <[email protected]> Cc: Tom Rix <[email protected]> Cc: Moritz Fischer <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Griffin Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> [ Yilun: Fix stable tag, add Fixes tag ] Reviewed-by: Xu Yilun <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2026070620-unwired-clay-f6cc@gregkh Signed-off-by: Xu Yilun <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Baokun Li <[email protected]> Date: Mon Aug 17 23:18:01 2026 +0800 fuse: fix invalidate lock leak on open O_TRUNC DAX failure commit a927f1867e61b78f39f9da0bbba3c98c2ca151fe upstream. fuse_open() takes filemap_invalidate_lock() for a DAX truncate (dax_truncate = true) and releases it before the out_inode_unlock label. But when fuse_dax_break_layouts() fails, the goto out_inode_unlock skips the unlock and leaks the rwsem, so any later fault or truncate on the file stalls on the stale lock. fuse_dax_break_layouts() can fail with -ERESTARTSYS when a signal interrupts the wait for busy DAX pages to drain: open("file", O_RDWR | O_TRUNC) └─ fuse_open() ├─ filemap_invalidate_lock() # dax_truncate └─ fuse_dax_break_layouts() └─ dax_break_layout() └─ wait_page_idle() # TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE └─ fuse_wait_dax_page() # unlock, schedule, re-lock └─ signal → -ERESTARTSYS goto out_inode_unlock # <- lock leaked Fix this by moving filemap_invalidate_unlock() below the label so that all error paths release the lock, and rename the label to out_unlock as it now covers more than just the inode lock. Fixes: 2fdbb8dd0155 ("fuse: fix deadlock between atomic O_TRUNC and page invalidation") Cc: [email protected] # v6.0+ Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Baokun Li <[email protected]> Date: Mon Aug 17 23:18:00 2026 +0800 fuse: fix invalidate lock leak on setattr writeback failure commit 9afeca0d569c9fc89d758fe7a9339d1e8afb1546 upstream. fuse_do_setattr() takes filemap_invalidate_lock() for a DAX truncate (fault_blocked = true) and releases it at the out:/error: labels. But when a writeback flush is also needed, a write_inode_now() failure returns directly and leaks the lock, so any later fault or truncate on the file stalls on the stale rwsem. For example, truncate(2) on a setuid file reaches fuse_do_setattr() with both ATTR_SIZE and ATTR_MODE set: truncate(2) └─ do_truncate() ├─ dentry_needs_remove_privs() # S_ISUID └─ notify_change() # KILL_SUID -> ATTR_MODE └─ fuse_setattr() # no killpriv: │ # ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE └─ fuse_do_setattr() ├─ filemap_invalidate_lock() # IS_DAX && is_truncate └─ write_inode_now() # is_wb && ATTR_MODE └─ if (err) # e.g. daemon -> -EIO return err # <- lock leaked Fix this by adding an unlock label that releases the lock before returning the error, and use it for the fuse_dax_break_layouts() failure path as well. Fixes: 6ae330cad6ef ("virtiofs: serialize truncate/punch_hole and dax fault path") Cc: [email protected] # v5.10+ Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Michael Zaidman <[email protected]> Date: Thu Aug 27 00:39:59 2026 -0400 HID: ft260: fix i2c probing for hwmon devices [ Upstream commit a94f61e63f337d95001e1a976ab701100fa1d666 ] The below scenario causes the kernel NULL pointer dereference failure: 1. sudo insmod hid-ft260.ko 2. sudo modprobe lm75 3. unplug USB hid-ft260 4. plug USB hid-ft260 [ +0.000006] Call Trace: [ +0.000004] __i2c_smbus_xfer.part.0+0xd1/0x310 [ +0.000007] ? ft260_smbus_write+0x140/0x140 [hid_ft260] [ +0.000005] __i2c_smbus_xfer+0x2b/0x80 [ +0.000004] i2c_smbus_xfer+0x61/0xf0 [ +0.000005] i2c_default_probe+0xf9/0x130 [ +0.000004] i2c_detect_address+0x84/0x160 [ +0.000004] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xf6/0x200 [ +0.000009] ? i2c_detect.isra.0+0x69/0x130 [ +0.000005] i2c_detect.isra.0+0xbf/0x130 [ +0.000004] ? __process_new_driver+0x30/0x30 [ +0.000004] __process_new_adapter+0x18/0x20 [ +0.000004] bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xd0 [ +0.000003] i2c_register_adapter+0x1e4/0x400 [ +0.000005] i2c_add_adapter+0x5c/0x80 [ +0.000004] ft260_probe.cold+0x222/0x2e2 [hid_ft260] [ +0.000006] hid_device_probe+0x10e/0x170 [hid] [ +0.000009] really_probe+0xff/0x460 [ +0.000004] driver_probe_device+0xe9/0x160 [ +0.000003] __device_attach_driver+0x71/0xd0 [ +0.000004] ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x50/0x50 [ +0.000004] bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xd0 [ +0.000002] __device_attach+0xde/0x1e0 [ +0.000004] device_initial_probe+0x13/0x20 [ +0.000004] bus_probe_device+0x8f/0xa0 [ +0.000003] device_add+0x333/0x5f0 It happened when i2c core probed for the devices associated with the lm75 driver by invoking 2c_detect()-->..-->ft260_smbus_write() from within the ft260_probe before setting the adapter data with i2c_set_adapdata(). Moving the i2c_set_adapdata() before i2c_add_adapter() fixed the failure. Signed-off-by: Michael Zaidman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Germain Hebert <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> Stable-dep-of: bf3e39df3a39 ("HID: ft260: fix stack-use-after-return write in I2C read race") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Raman Varabets <[email protected]> Date: Thu Aug 27 00:40:06 2026 -0400 HID: ft260: fix stack-use-after-return write in I2C read race [ Upstream commit bf3e39df3a397fd82967a31d17c4e02c7feab221 ] ft260_i2c_read() points dev->read_buf at a caller-supplied buffer (often an on-stack variable), arms a completion and waits up to five seconds for the device to return the data. The HID input callback ft260_raw_event() runs in the input/IRQ path, independent of the dev->lock mutex held by the read path, and copies the device-supplied payload into dev->read_buf after a plain NULL check. These two paths share read_buf, read_idx and read_len with no serialization. If the device delays its response until the read times out, ft260_i2c_read() resets the controller, clears read_buf and returns, unwinding the stack frame the buffer lived in. A response that arrives at that moment lets ft260_raw_event() pass the NULL check and then memcpy() the device-controlled payload into the now-freed stack location, a bounded but attacker-influenced stack-use-after-return write triggerable by malicious or malfunctioning hardware. Add a dedicated spinlock that serializes every access to read_buf, read_idx and read_len. ft260_raw_event() now holds it across the NULL check, the memcpy and the index update, while the read path takes it when arming and when clearing the buffer, so the teardown can no longer slip between the check and the copy. Fixes: 6a82582d9fa4 ("HID: ft260: add usb hid to i2c host bridge driver") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Raman Varabets <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Michael Zaidman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> [ de-indented one tab and renamed `rd_len` to `len` since the chunking loop in `ft260_i2c_read()` is absent. ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Michael Zaidman <[email protected]> Date: Thu Aug 27 00:40:01 2026 -0400 HID: ft260: improve i2c large reads performance [ Upstream commit 54410c14800ad652c77e5c6fc5c17baad6e42cb6 ] The patch increases the read buffer size to 180 bytes. It reduces the number of ft260_i2c_read() calls by three, improving the big reads performance. $ sudo i2ctransfer -y -f 13 w2@0x51 0x0 0x0 r180 Before: [ +4.071878] ft260_i2c_write_read: off 0x0 rlen 180 wlen 2 [ +0.000005] ft260_i2c_write: rep 0xd0 addr 0x51 off 0 len 2 wlen 2 flag 0x2 d[0] 0x0 [ +0.001097] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x41, clock 100 [ +0.000175] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x40, clock 100 [ +0.000004] ft260_i2c_read: rep 0xc2 addr 0x51 len 180 rlen 60 flag 0x3 [ +0.008579] ft260_raw_event: i2c resp: rep 0xde len 60 [ +0.000208] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x40, clock 100 [ +0.000001] ft260_i2c_read: rep 0xc2 addr 0x51 len 120 rlen 60 flag 0x0 [ +0.008794] ft260_raw_event: i2c resp: rep 0xde len 60 [ +0.000181] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x40, clock 100 [ +0.000002] ft260_i2c_read: rep 0xc2 addr 0x51 len 60 rlen 60 flag 0x4 [ +0.008817] ft260_raw_event: i2c resp: rep 0xde len 60 [ +0.000223] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x20, clock 100 After: [ +11.611642] ft260_i2c_write_read: off 0x0 rlen 180 wlen 2 [ +0.000005] ft260_i2c_write: rep 0xd0 addr 0x51 off 0 len 2 wlen 2 flag 0x2 d[0] 0x0 [ +0.008001] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x20, clock 100 [ +0.000001] ft260_i2c_read: rep 0xc2 addr 0x51 len 180 rlen 180 flag 0x7 [ +0.008994] ft260_raw_event: i2c resp: rep 0xde len 60 [ +0.007987] ft260_raw_event: i2c resp: rep 0xde len 60 [ +0.007992] ft260_raw_event: i2c resp: rep 0xde len 60 [ +0.000206] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x20, clock 100 Suggested-by: Enrik Berkhan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Zaidman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> Stable-dep-of: bf3e39df3a39 ("HID: ft260: fix stack-use-after-return write in I2C read race") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Michael Zaidman <[email protected]> Date: Thu Aug 27 00:40:00 2026 -0400 HID: ft260: improve i2c write performance [ Upstream commit 6fca5e3f5574ca1bd5bade5737848c816f924c6a ] The patch improves the I2C write performance by 20 - 30 percent by revising the sleep time in the ft260_hid_output_report_check_status() in the following ways: 1. Reduce the wait time and start to poll earlier. Sending a large amount of data at a low I2C clock rate saturates the internal FT260 buffer and causes hiccups in status readiness, as shown below in the log fragment. Aligning the status check wait time to the worst case significantly reduces the write performance. [Oct22 10:28] ft260_i2c_write: rep 0xd8 addr 0x51 off 0 len 34 d[0] 0x0 [ +0.005296] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x20, clock 100 [ +0.013460] ft260_i2c_write: rep 0xd8 addr 0x51 off 0 len 34 d[0] 0x0 [ +0.003244] ft260_hid_output_report_check_status: wait 1920 usec, len 38 [ +0.000190] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x40, clock 100 [ +0.015324] ft260_i2c_write: rep 0xd8 addr 0x51 off 0 len 34 d[0] 0x0 [ +0.003491] ft260_hid_output_report_check_status: wait 1920 usec, len 38 [ +0.000202] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x40, clock 100 [ +0.016047] ft260_i2c_write: rep 0xd8 addr 0x51 off 0 len 34 d[0] 0x0 [ +0.002768] ft260_hid_output_report_check_status: wait 1920 usec, len 38 [ +0.000150] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x40, clock 100 [ +0.011389] ft260_i2c_write: rep 0xd8 addr 0x51 off 0 len 34 d[0] 0x0 [ +0.003467] ft260_hid_output_report_check_status: wait 1920 usec, len 38 [ +0.000191] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x41, clock 100 [ +0.000172] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x41, clock 100 [ +0.000131] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x41, clock 100 [ +0.000241] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x41, clock 100 [ +0.000233] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x41, clock 100 [ +0.000190] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x41, clock 100 [ +0.000196] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x40, clock 100 [ +0.011314] ft260_i2c_write: rep 0xd8 addr 0x51 off 0 len 34 d[0] 0x0 [ +0.003334] ft260_hid_output_report_check_status: wait 1920 usec, len 38 [ +0.000227] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x41, clock 100 [ +0.000204] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x41, clock 100 [ +0.000198] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x41, clock 100 [ +0.000147] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x40, clock 100 [ +0.011060] ft260_i2c_write: rep 0xd8 addr 0x51 off 0 len 34 d[0] 0x0 Before: $ sudo ./i2cperf -f 2 -o 2 -s 32 -r 0-0xff 13 0x51 -S Fill block with increment via i2ctransfer by chunks ------------------------------------------------------------------- data rate(bps) efficiency(%) data size(B) total IOs IO size(B) ------------------------------------------------------------------- 40510 80 256 8 32 After: $ sudo ./i2cperf -f 2 -o 2 -s 32 -r 0-0xff 13 0x51 -S Fill block with increment via i2ctransfer by chunks ------------------------------------------------------------------- data rate(bps) efficiency(%) data size(B) total IOs IO size(B) ------------------------------------------------------------------- 52584 80 256 8 32 2. Do not sleep if the estimated I2C transfer time is below 2 ms since the first xfer status query frequently takes around 1.5 ms, and the following status queries take about 200us on average. So we usually return from the routine after the first 1 - 3 status checks. [Oct22 11:14] ft260_i2c_write: rep 0xd4 addr 0x51 off 0 len 18 d[0] 0x0 [ +0.004270] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x20, clock 100 [ +0.013889] ft260_i2c_write: rep 0xd4 addr 0x51 off 0 len 18 d[0] 0x0 [ +0.000856] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x41, clock 100 [ +0.000138] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x40, clock 100 [ +0.013352] ft260_i2c_write: rep 0xd4 addr 0x51 off 0 len 18 d[0] 0x0 [ +0.001501] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x41, clock 100 [ +0.000177] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x40, clock 100 [ +0.014477] ft260_i2c_write: rep 0xd4 addr 0x51 off 0 len 18 d[0] 0x0 [ +0.001377] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x41, clock 100 [ +0.000233] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x41, clock 100 [ +0.000191] ft260_xfer_status: bus_status 0x40, clock 100 [ +0.013197] ft260_i2c_write: rep 0xd4 addr 0x51 off 0 len 18 d[0] 0x0 Before: $ sudo ./i2cperf -f 2 -o 2 -s 16 -r 0-0xff 13 0x51 -S Fill block with increment via i2ctransfer by chunks ------------------------------------------------------------------- data rate(bps) efficiency(%) data size(B) total IOs IO size(B) ------------------------------------------------------------------- 28826 73 256 16 16 After: $ sudo ./i2cperf -f 2 -o 2 -s 16 -r 0-0xff 13 0x51 -S Fill block with increment via i2ctransfer by chunks ------------------------------------------------------------------- data rate(bps) efficiency(%) data size(B) total IOs IO size(B) ------------------------------------------------------------------- 45138 73 256 16 16 Signed-off-by: Michael Zaidman <[email protected]> Tested-by: Guillaume Champagne <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> Stable-dep-of: bf3e39df3a39 ("HID: ft260: fix stack-use-after-return write in I2C read race") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Michael Zaidman <[email protected]> Date: Thu Aug 27 00:40:04 2026 -0400 HID: ft260: missed NACK from busy device [ Upstream commit 5afac727defa0b2a3dffb2abd5fb5f594b98d217 ] When writing into a slow device like an EEPROM chip, the controller may exit the busy state before the device releases the bus. In this case, the ft260_xfer_status returns success before the data transfer completion. The patch fixes it by returning from the ft260_xfer_status() with the "-EAGAIN" on both controller and bus busy status when appropriate. It does not apply to the i2c combined transactions when after the write IO, the controller keeps the bus busy until the read IO and then between reading IOs to ensure an atomic operation. Co-developed-by: Germain Hebert <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Germain Hebert <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Zaidman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> Stable-dep-of: bf3e39df3a39 ("HID: ft260: fix stack-use-after-return write in I2C read race") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Michael Zaidman <[email protected]> Date: Thu Aug 27 00:40:02 2026 -0400 HID: ft260: skip unexpected HID input reports [ Upstream commit b7121e3c04440cc2af9cabbabb24efd23741294a ] The FT260 is not supposed to generate unexpected HID reports. However, in theory, the unsolicited HID Input reports can be issued by a specially crafted malicious USB device masquerading as FT260 when the attacker has physical access to the USB port. In this case, the read_buf pointer points to the final data portion of the previous I2C Read transfer, and the memcpy invoked in the ft260_raw_event() will try copying the content of the unexpected report into the wrong location. This commit sets the Read buffer pointer to NULL on the I2C Read transaction completion and checks it in the ft260_raw_event() to detect and skip the unsolicited Input report. Reported-by: Enrik Berkhan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Zaidman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> Stable-dep-of: bf3e39df3a39 ("HID: ft260: fix stack-use-after-return write in I2C read race") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Michael Zaidman <[email protected]> Date: Thu Aug 27 00:40:05 2026 -0400 HID: ft260: validate i2c input report length [ Upstream commit 80c4bbb2b38513e9c3d84805fa61a0ee16d79c45 ] Add two checks to ft260_raw_event() to prevent out-of-bounds reads from malicious or malfunctioning devices: First, reject reports shorter than the 2-byte header (report ID + length fields). Without this, even accessing xfer->length on a 1-byte report is an OOB read. Second, validate xfer->length against the actual data capacity of the received HID report. Each I2C data report ID (0xD0 through 0xDE) defines a different report size in the HID descriptor, so the available payload varies per report. A corrupted length field could cause memcpy to read beyond the report buffer. Reported-by: Sebastián Josué Alba Vives <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Zaidman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> Stable-dep-of: bf3e39df3a39 ("HID: ft260: fix stack-use-after-return write in I2C read race") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Michael Zaidman <[email protected]> Date: Thu Aug 27 00:40:03 2026 -0400 HID: ft260: wake up device from power saving mode [ Upstream commit 4b3da6853a619a952e8caf2e8393264dd42ffa27 ] The FT260 can enter a power saving mode after being idle for longer than 5 seconds. When being woken up from power saving mode by an I2C write request, a possible NACK is not correctly reported by the controller. As a workaround, the driver will issue an I2C status report two times in ft260_xfer_status() after the chip has been idle for more than 5s. Co-developed-by: Enrik Berkhan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Enrik Berkhan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Zaidman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> Stable-dep-of: bf3e39df3a39 ("HID: ft260: fix stack-use-after-return write in I2C read race") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Jose Villaseñor Montfort <[email protected]> Date: Thu Aug 27 00:40:12 2026 -0400 HID: input: read battery capacity from its actual report offset [ Upstream commit d07644524b6511b622ee7b0e2e68c9ee43d522a4 ] hidinput_query_battery_capacity() assumes the state-of-charge value is the first byte following the report ID (buf[1]) and ignores where the battery field actually sits within the report. An Apple Magic Trackpad 2 precedes the AbsoluteStateOfCharge byte with a byte of status flags in its battery reports, so this query returns the flags byte instead of the charge level. The device happens to make that easy to observe, because it exposes the same cell twice: its report descriptor declares AbsoluteStateOfCharge in two reports (0x90 and 0x9b), so hidinput_setup_battery() registers two power supplies. Only the first one is refreshed by hid-magicmouse -- it uses hid_get_battery(), which returns the first battery of the list -- and that refresh goes through the report event path, which parses the field correctly. Nothing ever reports the second one, so every read of its capacity takes the query path above. On a USB-C Magic Trackpad over USB, on an unpatched 7.1.5: hid-<serial>-battery-144 = 100% (Charging) <- report event path hid-<serial>-battery-155 = 3% (Discharging) <- query path Both are the same physical battery. A raw HIDIOCGINPUT of the two reports at that same moment: report 0x90 -> [90 03 64] report 0x9b -> [9b 03 64 64 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00] ^flags ^SoC = 0x64 = 100% The device answers correctly in both cases; only the offset the kernel reads the capacity from is wrong. 0x03 is the flags byte (present, charging), reported as "3%". Bluetooth takes the same query path for its capacity, where the trackpad reported a bogus near-constant ~4% -- 0b100, the FullyCharged flag -- regardless of the real charge. Store the battery field's offset within the report at setup time and use it when querying, so the capacity is read from its real position. The report event path already parses the field correctly through the HID core; only the explicit GET_REPORT query was wrong. Devices whose capacity field is the first field in the report have a report_offset of 0 and are unaffected (buf[1 + 0] == buf[1]). Fixes: 581c4484769e ("HID: input: map digitizer battery usage") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Jose Villaseñor Montfort <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alec Hall <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> [ Adapted `bat->report_offset` and other `struct hid_battery` accessors to the flat `dev->battery_*` fields on `struct hid_device` and replaced `__free(kfree)` with manual `kfree(buf)` calls. ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Jose Villaseñor Montfort <[email protected]> Date: Wed Aug 26 09:11:19 2026 -0400 HID: magicmouse: prevent unbounded recursion in magicmouse_raw_event() [ Upstream commit db8d634128d2ba88d79c0b601e983ebe14bb0519 ] magicmouse_raw_event() handles DOUBLE_REPORT_ID (0xf7) packets, which pack two touch reports into one, by splitting the packet and calling itself on each half. The only guard against runaway recursion is a "size < 1" check, which stops zero-sized calls but does not bound the recursion depth. A malicious HID device that matches this driver can send a report starting with DOUBLE_REPORT_ID and filled with the sequence [0xf7, 0x00]. Each level consumes two bytes and recurses on the remainder, so an incoming report of up to HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE (16 KiB) drives roughly 8000 nested calls. That easily exhausts the 16 KiB kernel stack, leading to a stack overflow: a panic with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK, or memory corruption without it. A double report only ever wraps two normal reports; it is never legitimately nested. Refuse to re-enter the DOUBLE_REPORT_ID case from a recursive call so the recursion depth is bounded to two, while all valid packets keep being parsed exactly as before. Fixes: a462230e16ac ("HID: magicmouse: enable Magic Trackpad support") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-input/[email protected]/ Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Jose Villaseñor Montfort <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alec Hall <[email protected]> Tested-by: Alec Hall <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Ibrahim Hashimov <[email protected]> Date: Wed Aug 26 13:47:45 2026 -0400 HID: uclogic: fix use-after-free of inrange_timer on remove [ Upstream commit 506fd50a9027340f0e9dcc587d10ccb03312dba6 ] uclogic_remove() cancels the pen in-range timer and then stops the device: timer_delete_sync(&drvdata->inrange_timer); hid_hw_stop(hdev); timer_delete_sync() only guarantees the timer is idle at that instant. uclogic_raw_event_pen() keeps delivering pen reports until hid_hw_stop() stops the transport several lines later, and every report with pen->inrange == UCLOGIC_PARAMS_PEN_INRANGE_NONE re-arms the timer: mod_timer(&drvdata->inrange_timer, jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(100)); A report landing between the timer_delete_sync() call and the transport teardown in hid_hw_stop() re-arms inrange_timer after it was cancelled. uclogic_remove() then returns and the devm drvdata is freed, while hid_hw_stop() has already freed the input device drvdata->pen_input points at, so when the timer fires ~100 ms later uclogic_inrange_timeout() dereferences freed memory -- a use-after-free in timer-softirq context. Swapping the two calls is not a fix: stopping the device first frees drvdata->pen_input via hidinput_disconnect() while the timer may still be pending, so a timer already armed before removal fires on the freed input device in the window before timer_delete_sync() runs. Use timer_shutdown_sync() before hid_hw_stop() instead. It cancels the timer, waits for a running callback while pen_input is still valid, and prevents any further re-arming -- a later mod_timer() from an in-flight report is silently ignored -- so the timer is provably dead before hid_hw_stop() frees the inputs. This is the ordering the timer core documents for this "timer re-armed from another path" teardown case. Fixes: 01309e29eb95 ("HID: uclogic: Support in-range reporting emulation") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov <[email protected]> Assisted-by: AuditCode-AI:2026.07 Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> [ changed timer_delete_sync() to del_timer_sync() in the removed line to match the pre-rename API on this branch ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Vishnu Razdan <[email protected]> Date: Tue Aug 25 09:54:10 2026 -0700 io_uring/io-wq: fix worker accounting when canceling creation callbacks commit 297b5ccea4acacaa47c150f043bce695202afbf1 upstream. create_worker_cb() reserves an io-wq worker slot only after its task-work callback runs. If the callback is canceled before then, io_worker_cancel_cb() still decrements acct->nr_workers. When an existing worker retires with its creation callback pending, that worker has already decremented the same account's worker count. The resulting undercount permits worker creation beyond the account's configured limit. On an AST2600 OpenBMC system, an unchanged sensor daemon reached 4,291 threads with the original kernel. With an equivalent downstream fix, 25 passive samples under its normal workload showed 6-9 threads. Decrement nr_workers only when the canceled callback is not create_worker_cb(). Continuation callbacks still release their reserved slot, and both callback types retain the existing running-count, reference-count, and create-state cleanup. [ Backport: retain the existing worker->wqe->lock protecting worker accounting. ] Fixes: 1d5f5ea7cb7d ("io-wq: remove worker to owner tw dependency") Cc: [email protected] Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6-sol Reviewed-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Vishnu Razdan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Author: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Date: Sun Jul 5 18:17:54 2026 +0000 ipv4: igmp: Fix potential UAF in igmp_gq_start_timer() commit 7b19c0f81ed1fdaec6bc522569be367199a9edf3 upstream. A race condition exists between device teardown (inetdev_destroy) and incoming IGMP query processing (igmp_rcv), leading to a Use-After-Free in the IGMP timer callback. During device destruction, inetdev_destroy() drops the primary reference to in_device, which can drop its refcount to 0. The actual freeing of in_device memory is deferred via RCU (using call_rcu()). Concurrently, igmp_rcv() runs under RCU read lock and obtains the in_device pointer. Because the memory is RCU-protected, CPU-0 can safely dereference in_device even if its refcount has hit 0. However, if CPU-0 calls igmp_gq_start_timer() and re-arms the timer, it attempts to acquire a reference using in_dev_hold(). This increments the refcount from 0 to 1, triggering a "refcount_t: addition on 0" warning. Since the in_device memory is still scheduled to be freed after the RCU grace period (as the free callback does not check the refcount again), the device is freed while the timer is still armed. When the timer expires, it accesses the freed memory, causing a kernel panic. Fix this by using refcount_inc_not_zero() (via a new helper in_dev_hold_safe()) to prevent acquiring a reference if the device is already being destroyed. If the refcount is 0, we do not arm the timer. A similar issue in IPv6 MLD is fixed in a subsequent patch. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: Zero Day Initiative <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> [Denis Arefev: adapted for 5.10/5.15: keep prandom_u32(), get_random_u32_below() not used here] Signed-off-by: Denis Arefev <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Kyle Zeng <[email protected]> Date: Mon Aug 17 08:58:38 2026 +0000 ipv6: seg6: clear IPv4 control block on IPIP decapsulation commit 44930446dde45a7a90fe1446fa38eb0e2c561646 upstream. End.DX4 and End.DT4 decapsulate an IPv4 packet through decap_and_validate() and send it directly to IPv4 routing. The inner packet therefore bypasses ip_rcv_core(), which normally clears IPCB before IPv4 interprets skb->cb. The skb instead retains IP6CB data from the outer packet. IP6CB and IPCB use the same skb->cb storage, so IP6CB(skb)->lastopt overlaps IPCB(skb)->opt.optlen and srr, while IP6CB(skb)->nhoff overlaps rr and ts. The sender can make the stale optlen byte nonzero with a valid outer extension-header chain. The reproducers put an eight-byte Destination Options header immediately after the 40-byte IPv6 header and before the Segment Routing Header. ipv6_destopt_rcv() records the sender-controlled Destination Options offset in both lastopt and nhoff, setting them to 40. On the reproduced little-endian x86-64 kernel, IPv4 therefore sees optlen = 40 and rr = 40. Both tcp_v4_save_options() and __ip_options_echo() skip option copying when optlen is zero. Here optlen is 40, so the TCP SYN path allocates room for 40 bytes of option data and calls __ip_options_echo(). The stale rr value makes that function read inner packet byte 41 as the Record Route option length. The reproducers set that sender-controlled byte to 255, so __ip_options_echo() copies 255 bytes into the 40-byte option-data area. Separate End.DX4 and End.DT4 reproducers on the unpatched v7.2-rc5 kernel both produced: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo() Write of size 255 The relevant End.DX4 call path is: __ip_options_echo tcp_v4_route_req tcp_conn_request tcp_v4_conn_request tcp_rcv_state_process tcp_v4_do_rcv tcp_v4_rcv ip_protocol_deliver_rcu ip_local_deliver_finish ip_local_deliver input_action_end_dx4_finish input_action_end_dx4 The relevant End.DT4 call path is: __ip_options_echo tcp_v4_route_req tcp_conn_request tcp_v4_conn_request tcp_rcv_state_process tcp_v4_do_rcv tcp_v4_rcv ip_protocol_deliver_rcu ip_local_deliver_finish ip_local_deliver input_action_end_dt4 tcp_v4_save_options() is inlined into the tcp_v4_route_req() path, so it does not appear as a separate frame. When decap_and_validate() handles IPPROTO_IPIP, save the ingress interface from IP6CB, clear IPCB, and restore the saved value. Doing this in the common decapsulation path covers End.DX4, End.DT4, and End.DT46's IPv4 arm. Use IP6CB(skb)->iif rather than skb->skb_iif. These actions run after l3mdev processing, which can replace skb_iif with the L3 master; IP6CB iif still records the receiving interface set at IPv6 ingress. Fixes: 891ef8dd2a8d ("ipv6: sr: implement additional seg6local actions") Cc: [email protected] Suggested-by: Andrea Mayer <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: David Lee <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Lee <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andrea Mayer <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Date: Fri Aug 28 11:55:21 2026 +0300 ipvs: reload ip header after head reallocation commit a2f57827bf7c695b8c72dc4511cae8e86582369d upstream. __ip_vs_get_out_rt() calls skb_ensure_writable() which may reallocate skb->head. Fixes: 8d8e20e2d7bb ("ipvs: Decrement ttl") Cc: [email protected] Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-4-6 Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> [Denis Arefev: adapted for 5.10/6.1: keep EnterFunction/LeaveFunction instrumentation] Signed-off-by: Denis Arefev <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Author: Vasiliy Kovalev <[email protected]> Date: Tue Dec 24 17:49:14 2024 +0300 jfs: add check read-only before truncation in jfs_truncate_nolock() [ Upstream commit b5799dd77054c1ec49b0088b006c9908e256843b ] Added a check for "read-only" mode in the `jfs_truncate_nolock` function to avoid errors related to writing to a read-only filesystem. Call stack: block_write_begin() { jfs_write_failed() { jfs_truncate() { jfs_truncate_nolock() { txEnd() { ... log = JFS_SBI(tblk->sb)->log; // (log == NULL) If the `isReadOnly(ip)` condition is triggered in `jfs_truncate_nolock`, the function execution will stop, and no further data modification will occur. Instead, the `xtTruncate` function will be called with the "COMMIT_WMAP" flag, preventing modifications in "read-only" mode. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: [email protected] Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4e89b5368baba8324e07 Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kovalev <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Author: Vasiliy Kovalev <[email protected]> Date: Tue Dec 24 17:49:13 2024 +0300 jfs: add check read-only before txBeginAnon() call [ Upstream commit 0176e69743ecc02961f2ae1ea42439cd2bf9ed58 ] Added a read-only check before calling `txBeginAnon` in `extAlloc` and `extRecord`. This prevents modification attempts on a read-only mounted filesystem, avoiding potential errors or crashes. Call trace: txBeginAnon+0xac/0x154 extAlloc+0xe8/0xdec fs/jfs/jfs_extent.c:78 jfs_get_block+0x340/0xb98 fs/jfs/inode.c:248 __block_write_begin_int+0x580/0x166c fs/buffer.c:2128 __block_write_begin fs/buffer.c:2177 [inline] block_write_begin+0x98/0x11c fs/buffer.c:2236 jfs_write_begin+0x44/0x88 fs/jfs/inode.c:299 Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: [email protected] Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4e89b5368baba8324e07 Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kovalev <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Author: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]> Date: Tue Aug 25 15:48:11 2026 -0400 kcov: fix data corruption and race conditions on PREEMPT_RT [ Upstream commit 2eed77fdcb0cc48e8eccb2bcd4b7f2c6d650e84c ] syzbot is reporting KCOV state corruption on PREEMPT_RT kernels, for the temporary storage used for saving/restoring remote KCOV state is currently allocated as the per-CPU area. On PREEMPT_RT kernels, softirq handlers run as preemptible task threads (e.g., ksoftirqd). If a softirq context preempts a task running a remote KCOV session, it safely saves the task's state into the per-CPU area. However, if that softirq thread is subsequently preempted by a higher- priority softirq thread on the same CPU, the second softirq will overwrite the same per-CPU area, permanently destroying the original task's KCOV state. Fix this data corruption by moving the temporary storage from the per-CPU area to the per-thread area. Since each softirq thread now owns its own task context, nested softirq preemption no longer causes data overwrites. Note that while the temporary storage is now on a per-thread basis, the per-CPU kcov_percpu_data.lock must be retained, for we need to ensure that kcov_remote_start() and kcov_remote_stop() operate atomically without racing against asynchronous interrupts that manipulate the current task's KCOV state. It is likely that GFP_KERNEL allocation by vmalloc_node() in kcov_init() has already called panic() before returning NULL, for there will be no OOM-killable userspace processes when __init function of built-in module runs. But this patch also fixes crashing the kernel when vmalloc_node() in kcov_init() returned NULL, for kcov_init() left per-CPU irq_area == NULL but kcov_remote_start() depends on per-CPU irq_area != NULL, resulting in (1) doing vmalloc() in kcov_remote_start() despite !in_task() context (2) out-of-array-bounds access if (1) succeeded but kcov->remote_size < CONFIG_KCOV_IRQ_AREA_SIZE (3) always leak memory allocated by (1), eventually killing all OOM-killable userspace processes problems. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/[email protected] Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=3f51ad7ac3ae57a6fdcc Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=47cf95ca1f9dcca872c8 Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=8a173e13208949931dc7 Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=90984d3713722683112e Analyzed-by: AI Mode in Google Search (no mail address) Fixes: 5ff3b30ab57d ("kcov: collect coverage from interrupts") Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Alan Stern <[email protected]> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Cc: Clark Williams <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Brown <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> [ Adjusted the `kcov_init()` deletion context to plain `vmalloc()` since 5.15 lacks the `vmalloc_node()`/`cpu_to_node()` conversion. ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]> Date: Tue Aug 25 15:48:10 2026 -0400 kcov: replace local_irq_save() with a local_lock_t [ Upstream commit d5d2c51f1e5f56ed01d2c773974630c007e5e5f5 ] The kcov code mixes local_irq_save() and spin_lock() in kcov_remote_{start|end}(). This creates a warning on PREEMPT_RT because local_irq_save() disables interrupts and spin_lock_t is turned into a sleeping lock which can not be acquired in a section with disabled interrupts. The kcov_remote_lock is used to synchronize the access to the hash-list kcov_remote_map. The local_irq_save() block protects access to the per-CPU data kcov_percpu_data. There is no compelling reason to change the lock type to raw_spin_lock_t to make it work with local_irq_save(). Changing it would require to move memory allocation (in kcov_remote_add()) and deallocation outside of the locked section. Adding an unlimited amount of entries to the hashlist will increase the IRQ-off time during lookup. It could be argued that this is debug code and the latency does not matter. There is however no need to do so and it would allow to use this facility in an RT enabled build. Using a local_lock_t instead of local_irq_save() has the befit of adding a protection scope within the source which makes it obvious what is protected. On a !PREEMPT_RT && !LOCKDEP build the local_lock_irqsave() maps directly to local_irq_save() so there is overhead at runtime. Replace the local_irq_save() section with a local_lock_t. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reported-by: Clark Williams <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]> Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Acked-by: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Tested-by: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Stable-dep-of: 2eed77fdcb0c ("kcov: fix data corruption and race conditions on PREEMPT_RT") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Oliver Upton <[email protected]> Date: Tue Sep 30 01:52:37 2025 -0700 KVM: arm64: Prevent access to vCPU events before init [ Upstream commit 0aa1b76fe1429629215a7c79820e4b96233ac4a3 ] Another day, another syzkaller bug. KVM erroneously allows userspace to pend vCPU events for a vCPU that hasn't been initialized yet, leading to KVM interpreting a bunch of uninitialized garbage for routing / injecting the exception. In one case the injection code and the hyp disagree on whether the vCPU has a 32bit EL1 and put the vCPU into an illegal mode for AArch64, tripping the BUG() in exception_target_el() during the next injection: kernel BUG at arch/arm64/kvm/inject_fault.c:40! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 318 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.17.0-rc4-00104-g10fd0285305d #6 PREEMPT Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 21402009 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : exception_target_el+0x88/0x8c lr : pend_serror_exception+0x18/0x13c sp : ffff800082f03a10 x29: ffff800082f03a10 x28: ffff0000cb132280 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff0000c2a99c20 x24: 0000000000000000 x23: 0000000000008000 x22: 0000000000000002 x21: 0000000000000004 x20: 0000000000008000 x19: ffff0000c2a99c20 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 00000000200000c0 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : ffff800082f03af8 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : ffff800080f621f0 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 000000000040009b x1 : 0000000000000003 x0 : ffff0000c2a99c20 Call trace: exception_target_el+0x88/0x8c (P) kvm_inject_serror_esr+0x40/0x3b4 __kvm_arm_vcpu_set_events+0xf0/0x100 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x180/0x9d4 kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x60c/0x9f4 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xac/0x104 invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 el0_svc+0x34/0xf0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe4 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c Code: f946bc01 b4fffe61 9101e020 17fffff2 (d4210000) Reject the ioctls outright as no sane VMM would call these before KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT anyway. Even if it did the exception would've been thrown away by the eventual reset of the vCPU's state. Cc: [email protected] # 6.17 Fixes: b7b27facc7b5 ("arm/arm64: KVM: Add KVM_GET/SET_VCPU_EVENTS") Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Author: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Date: Tue Aug 11 17:37:36 2026 +0200 KVM: s390: vsie: zero stale crypto bits commit 34d5b5b646c91cfb9338d7a12c955a70ffb8c66b upstream. When shadowing crypto access bits from a format0 apcb (crycb 0 or 1), the bits 64..255 are unchanged from whatever is in the vsie page in the crycb and thus in the apcb. This gives a nested guest potential access to a device no longer available. Zero out the remaining bits. Fixes: 6b79de4b056e ("KVM: s390: vsie: allow guest FORMAT-1 CRYCB on host FORMAT-2") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]> Message-ID: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Date: Wed Sep 2 14:27:29 2026 +0200 Linux 5.15.220 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Tested-by: Florian Fainelli <[email protected]> Tested-by: Brett A C Sheffield <[email protected]> Tested-by: Harshit Mogalapalli <[email protected]> Tested-by: Pavel Machek (CIP) <[email protected]> Tested-by: Shuah Khan <[email protected]> Tested-by: Ron Economos <[email protected]> Tested-by: Barry K. Nathan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> Date: Mon Aug 3 11:04:26 2026 -0700 mm/swap: reject swapon() on filesystem-level encrypted files commit c310a8932a3107c9bc8f01d473e9d085f8aa9c98 upstream. ext4 and f2fs don't prevent filesystem-level encrypted files from being set up directly as swap files. In this case, encryption is bypassed. No one should be doing this, vs. the methods of encrypted swap that actually do work (such as swapping to a dm-crypt device, or swapping to a loopback device on top of a filesystem-level encrypted file). Nevertheless, to prevent user error, make swapon() explicitly reject this case. Document this behavior in fscrypt.rst as well. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/[email protected] Fixes: 9bd8212f981e ("ext4 crypto: add encryption policy and password salt support") Fixes: f424f664f0e8 ("f2fs crypto: add encryption policy and password salt support") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Baoquan He <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <[email protected]> Cc: Barry Song <[email protected]> Cc: Chris Li <[email protected]> Cc: Kairui Song <[email protected]> Cc: Kemeng Shi <[email protected]> Cc: Nhat Pham <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Norbert Szetei <[email protected]> Date: Wed Aug 26 11:12:27 2026 +0200 net: bridge: mcast: fix use-after-free of a master VLAN's multicast context commit 50e5c6605cc9c2dd57bd2d1b3459674d19738983 upstream. br_multicast_toggle_one_vlan() clears BR_VLFLAG_MCAST_ENABLED under br->multicast_lock before stopping a VLAN's multicast context. That is the teardown handshake: lockless readers gate on the flag through br_multicast_ctx_should_use() -> br_multicast_ctx_vlan_disabled(), so once it is cleared under the lock no reader can arm the context again. For a master VLAN the handshake never runs. __vlan_del() clears BRIDGE_VLAN_INFO_BRENTRY before calling br_vlan_put_master(), so br_multicast_toggle_one_vlan(masterv, false) returns early on !br_vlan_is_brentry(vlan): the flag stays set and br->multicast_lock is never taken. br_vlan_put_master() then drains the context in br_multicast_ctx_deinit() and frees the VLAN through call_rcu(), while a reader still inside rcu_read_lock() sees the context as enabled and re-arms it. The port and port-VLAN branch of the function has no br_vlan_is_brentry() test and flips the flag under br->multicast_lock, so it is not affected. The reader is the bridge transmit path. For a master VLAN br_multicast_rcv() selects brmctx = &vlan->br_mcast_ctx with pmctx = NULL, so IGMP sent to the bridge device re-arms the context's timers after br_multicast_ctx_deinit() has already stopped them. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in detach_if_pending+0x412/0x4a0 Write of size 8 at addr ffff88810ac39918 by task brmc/601 __mod_timer+0x51a/0xc50 br_multicast_host_join+0x25b/0x390 __br_multicast_add_group+0x468/0x530 br_ip4_multicast_add_group+0x1a0/0x260 br_multicast_rcv+0x2cda/0x61e0 br_dev_xmit+0x6c4/0x1540 Allocated by task 610: br_vlan_add+0x111/0xb40 br_vlan_info+0x370/0x3e0 Freed by task 0: kfree+0x1a7/0x4f0 rcu_core+0x7dc/0x10a0 Only test br_vlan_is_brentry() when enabling, like the br_multicast_ctx_vlan_global_disabled() test next to it. Disabling then always clears BR_VLFLAG_MCAST_ENABLED under br->multicast_lock before br_multicast_ctx_deinit() drains the context. Fixes: 7b54aaaf53cb ("net: bridge: multicast: add vlan state initialization and control") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Norbert Szetei <[email protected]> Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Bryam Vargas <[email protected]> Date: Wed Aug 26 08:45:03 2026 -0400 nfc: nci: add data_len bound checks to activation parameter extractors [ Upstream commit 0428fa2c22e2ba0cff766d3b80d461e149102045 ] nci_extract_activation_params_iso_dep() and nci_extract_activation_params_nfc_dep() read an inner length byte from the NCI RF_INTF_ACTIVATED_NTF payload and use it to memcpy() into fixed kernel buffers, but neither function receives the caller-validated activation_params_len. A crafted NCI notification with activation_params_len=1 and an inner length byte of up to 20 (NFC-A) or 50 (NFC-B) causes memcpy() to read that many bytes past the one valid byte in the activation params region -- a slab out-of-bounds read of kernel memory adjacent to the NCI skb. The sibling nci_extract_rf_params_*() family was given equivalent protection by commit 571dcbeb8e63 ("net: nfc: nci: Fix parameter validation for packet data"), but the two activation parameter extractors were not updated at that time. Add a data_len parameter to both functions, guard against an empty region before consuming the inner length byte, decrement the remaining count after consuming it, and clamp the copy length to what is actually available. Update both call sites to pass ntf.activation_params_len, which is already validated against the skb at ntf.c:801. Fixes: e8c0dacd9836 ("NFC: Update names and structs to NCI spec 1.0 d18") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: David Heidelberg <[email protected]> [ Replaced `NFC_ATS_MAXSIZE` with the literal `20` since that macro doesn't exist in this tree. ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Ryusuke Konishi <[email protected]> Date: Tue Aug 25 21:46:26 2026 -0400 nilfs2: correct return value kernel-doc descriptions for ioctl functions [ Upstream commit 17c46a45cdb94c500f4e93b176cdd61931b03020 ] Patch series "nilfs2: fix kernel-doc comments for function return values", v2. This series fixes the inadequacies in the return value descriptions in nilfs2's kernel-doc comments (mainly incorrect formatting), as well as the lack of return value descriptions themselves, and fixes most of the remaining warnings that are output when the kernel-doc script is run with the "-Wall" option. This patch (of 7): In the kernel-doc comments for functions, there are many cases where the format of the return value description is inaccurate, such as "Return Value: ...", which causes many warnings to be output when the kernel-doc script is executed with the "-Wall" option. This fixes such incorrectly formatted return value descriptions for ioctl functions. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <[email protected]> Cc: "Brian G ." <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Stable-dep-of: a1735eae5544 ("nilfs2: reject invalid block index in GC ioctl") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Ryusuke Konishi <[email protected]> Date: Tue Aug 25 21:46:27 2026 -0400 nilfs2: reject invalid block index in GC ioctl [ Upstream commit a1735eae55448bc79c2da6593455791e886f6ed8 ] Syzbot reported list corruption caused by a double list_add_tail() call on bh->b_assoc_buffers within nilfs_lookup_dirty_data_buffers(). Analysis revealed that the root cause was the insertion of a page/folio with a page index of ULONG_MAX into the page cache via the GC ioctl. filemap_get_folios_tag(), called by nilfs_lookup_dirty_data_buffers(), repeatedly detects a dirty folio with a page index of ULONG_MAX due to index wrap-around, leading to duplicate processing of dirty buffers. As a preparatory step, the GC ioctl loads the page/folio of the block to be moved during GC and inserts it into the page cache based on information in the nilfs_vdesc structure passed as an argument. Normally, this does not cause issues because the user-space GC library configures the nilfs_vdesc structure properly. However, since there is no range check on the parameters determining the page index, a request with artificially crafted parameters -- such as those generated by Syzbot -- can result in a page/folio being inserted with a page index of ULONG_MAX, triggering the above problem. This resolves the issue by checking the ranges of 'vd_offset' and 'vd_vblocknr' in the nilfs_vdesc structure that determine the page index, thereby preventing the invalid page/folio insertions. Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c37bed40868932d790e9 Fixes: 7942b919f732 ("nilfs2: ioctl operations") Cc: wuyankun <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Weiwen Hu <[email protected]> Date: Wed Aug 26 13:14:01 2026 -0400 nvme: rename CDR/MORE/DNR to NVME_STATUS_* [ Upstream commit dd0b0a4a2c5d7209457dc172997d1243ad269cfa ] CDR/MORE/DNR fields are not belonging to SC in the NVMe spec, rename them to NVME_STATUS_* to avoid confusion. Signed-off-by: Weiwen Hu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <[email protected]> Stable-dep-of: 4a3f00262a04 ("nvmet-tcp: bound SGL data length before allocating command buffers") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Ibrahim Hashimov <[email protected]> Date: Wed Aug 26 13:14:02 2026 -0400 nvmet-tcp: bound SGL data length before allocating command buffers [ Upstream commit 4a3f00262a044e8e15064b1a6860968bf0500bf4 ] nvmet_tcp_map_data() reads the host-controlled 32-bit sgl->length and, for the in-capsule offset descriptor (type 0x01), checks it against port->inline_data_size before use. Any other SGL descriptor type -- including the non-inline transport SGL data-block descriptor (type (NVME_TRANSPORT_SGL_DATA_DESC << 4) | NVME_SGL_FMT_TRANSPORT_A, the type a real host uses for out-of-capsule writes) skips that check entirely and falls straight through to: cmd->req.sg = sgl_alloc(len, GFP_KERNEL, &cmd->req.sg_cnt); with len taken directly from the wire, unbounded up to 4 GiB. nvmet_req_init() only parses the command and never inspects sgl->length, and nvmet_check_transfer_len() -- the only other place transfer_len is validated -- runs later, from req->execute(), after the allocation has already happened. For a write command the target responds with an R2T and parks the command waiting for the host to send the data; if the host (or an unauthenticated peer that simply never follows up) never does, the sgl_alloc() buffer stays resident for the life of the command. NVMe/TCP has no mandatory authentication in the default configuration, so any peer able to reach the target portal and complete a Fabrics connect can drive this with a single crafted command, repeatable across queues and connections for amplification. This is unbounded kernel memory allocation triggered by a remote, effectively unauthenticated peer. Validate len against the same NVMET_TCP_MAXH2CDATA ceiling this file already uses to bound per-PDU H2C data, for every SGL descriptor type, before doing any allocation. This closes the gap for the non-inline descriptor while leaving the existing, tighter inline_data_size check in place for the in-capsule case. Runtime-verified on a v6.19 KASAN stand: with this bound in place, a crafted write command carrying an oversized non-inline SGL length is rejected before sgl_alloc() runs, where the same request previously drove an unbounded ~256 MiB kernel allocation (up to 4 GiB) that stayed resident pending an R2T the host never satisfies. Fixes: 872d26a391da ("nvmet-tcp: add NVMe over TCP target driver") Cc: [email protected] Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov <[email protected]> Assisted-by: AuditCode-AI:2026.07 Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Peiyang He <[email protected]> Date: Tue Aug 25 22:13:14 2026 +0200 RDMA/rxe: Fix OOB in free_rd_atomic_resources() commit de329533792a373186d79dca1ca120f8fa0afd05 upstream. free_rd_atomic_resources() iterates using qp->attr.max_dest_rd_atomic. Updating max_dest_rd_atomic before freeing the old array can make the free path walk past the old allocation and trigger a slab out-of-bounds write catched by KASAN: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in free_rd_atomic_resource drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:180 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in free_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:171 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in free_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:163 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rxe_qp_from_attr+0x1e88/0x2150 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:712 Write of size 4 at addr ffff88802b8dddb8 by task syz.3.451/11063 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 11063 Comm: syz.3.451 Not tainted 7.1.0 #2 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x10e/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xf7/0x600 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xe4/0x120 mm/kasan/report.c:595 free_rd_atomic_resource drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:180 [inline] free_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:171 [inline] free_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:163 [inline] rxe_qp_from_attr+0x1e88/0x2150 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:712 rxe_modify_qp+0x1e2/0x530 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c:623 ib_security_modify_qp+0x223/0xfa0 drivers/infiniband/core/security.c:625 _ib_modify_qp+0x333/0xec0 drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c:1915 modify_qp+0x13ca/0x1940 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1932 ib_uverbs_modify_qp+0xcb/0x120 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1958 ib_uverbs_write+0xb86/0x1030 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c:680 vfs_write+0x2aa/0x1070 fs/read_write.c:686 ksys_write+0x1f8/0x250 fs/read_write.c:740 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x116/0x800 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7fefc75a70cd Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fefc8495018 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fefc7835fa0 RCX: 00007fefc75a70cd RDX: 0000000000000078 RSI: 0000200000000240 RDI: 0000000000000007 RBP: 00007fefc764f10f R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007fefc7836038 R14: 00007fefc7835fa0 R15: 00007ffcf0586aa0 </TASK> Allocated by task 11063: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:57 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:78 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:398 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:415 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:263 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5296 [inline] __kmalloc_noprof+0x32a/0x850 mm/slub.c:5308 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:954 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1188 [inline] alloc_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:155 [inline] rxe_qp_from_attr+0x3f8/0x2150 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:714 rxe_modify_qp+0x1e2/0x530 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c:623 ib_security_modify_qp+0x223/0xfa0 drivers/infiniband/core/security.c:625 _ib_modify_qp+0x333/0xec0 drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c:1915 modify_qp+0x13ca/0x1940 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1932 ib_uverbs_modify_qp+0xcb/0x120 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1958 ib_uverbs_write+0xb86/0x1030 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c:680 vfs_write+0x2aa/0x1070 fs/read_write.c:686 ksys_write+0x1f8/0x250 fs/read_write.c:740 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x116/0x800 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802b8ddd80 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 56-byte region [ffff88802b8ddd80, ffff88802b8dddb8) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x2b8dd flags: 0xfff00000000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) page_type: f5(slab) raw: 00fff00000000000 ffff888015c418c0 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000800200020 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as allocated page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xd2c40(GFP_NOFS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC), pid 4651, tgid 4651 ((udev-worker)), ts 123427165316, free_ts 123425874255 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline] post_alloc_hook+0xfc/0x120 mm/page_alloc.c:1853 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1861 [inline] get_page_from_freelist+0x75b/0x3220 mm/page_alloc.c:3941 __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x27e/0x2b00 mm/page_alloc.c:5221 alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:3278 [inline] allocate_slab mm/slub.c:3467 [inline] new_slab+0xa6/0x670 mm/slub.c:3525 refill_objects+0x278/0x420 mm/slub.c:7272 refill_sheaf mm/slub.c:2816 [inline] __pcs_replace_empty_main+0x2ed/0x640 mm/slub.c:4652 alloc_from_pcs mm/slub.c:4750 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4884 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5295 [inline] __kmalloc_noprof+0x68d/0x850 mm/slub.c:5308 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:954 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1188 [inline] tomoyo_encode2+0x100/0x3e0 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:45 tomoyo_encode+0x29/0x50 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:80 tomoyo_realpath_from_path+0x18c/0x690 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:283 tomoyo_get_realpath security/tomoyo/file.c:151 [inline] tomoyo_check_open_permission+0x2ab/0x3c0 security/tomoyo/file.c:776 tomoyo_file_open+0x6b/0x90 security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c:334 security_file_open+0x7a/0x1b0 security/security.c:2739 do_dentry_open+0x57e/0x1690 fs/open.c:924 vfs_open+0x82/0x3f0 fs/open.c:1079 do_open fs/namei.c:4699 [inline] path_openat+0x218a/0x3190 fs/namei.c:4858 page last free pid 1 tgid 1 stack trace: reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline] __free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1397 [inline] __free_frozen_pages+0x763/0xfc0 mm/page_alloc.c:2938 selinux_genfs_get_sid security/selinux/hooks.c:1364 [inline] inode_doinit_with_dentry+0x903/0x1320 security/selinux/hooks.c:1563 selinux_d_instantiate+0x26/0x30 security/selinux/hooks.c:6658 security_d_instantiate+0x123/0x190 security/security.c:3704 d_splice_alias_ops+0x92/0x850 fs/dcache.c:3141 kernfs_iop_lookup+0x23f/0x2d0 fs/kernfs/dir.c:1289 lookup_open.isra.0+0x659/0x1080 fs/namei.c:4484 open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:4611 [inline] path_openat+0x17dd/0x3190 fs/namei.c:4855 do_file_open+0x20c/0x430 fs/namei.c:4887 do_sys_openat2+0x101/0x1d0 fs/open.c:1364 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1370 [inline] __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1386 [inline] __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1381 [inline] __x64_sys_openat+0x141/0x200 fs/open.c:1381 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x116/0x800 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88802b8ddc80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88802b8ddd00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff88802b8ddd80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff88802b8dde00: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88802b8dde80: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc Fix the OOB by moving the assignment after free_rd_atomic_resources() so the old array is freed using the old bound. This matches the original ordering in commit 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver"). Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/365C68B4923F8214+30195a67-0b90-4b92-ab96-2ce41517793c@smail.nju.edu.cn/ Fixes: b6bbee0d2438 ("IB/rxe: Properly honor max IRD value for rd/atomic.") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Peiyang He <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit de329533792a373186d79dca1ca120f8fa0afd05) [This commit is based on the upstream commit 6f7014237405 ("RDMA/rxe: Fix responder UAF on IB_QP_MAX_DEST_RD_ATOMIC modify_qp")] Signed-off-by: Zhu Yanjun <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Author: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Date: Sun Aug 30 11:07:47 2026 -0400 Revert "mtd: maps: vmu-flash: fix fault in unaligned fixup" This reverts commit 631edc934e476991a04723d3283e6628d077f8c1. Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Author: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Date: Sat Aug 29 20:58:47 2026 -0400 Revert "PM: sleep: Use complete() in device_pm_sleep_init()" This reverts commit 31064374d24dc18cf132ffb9d350f318f3274b06. Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Author: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Date: Sun Aug 30 11:08:17 2026 -0400 Revert "smb: client: use kvzalloc() for megabyte buffer in simple fallocate" This reverts commit d1bc345f6229412d45bab2baf81d45d0e678253a. Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Author: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]> Date: Wed Apr 29 15:18:40 2026 -0400 selinux: switch two allocations to use kzalloc_objs() [ Upstream commit cf6a513f1937581eb012a217b29817e025a1a0ef ] These were the only two allocations in the policy loading logic that were not already using kzalloc_objs() for the policy data structures. Fix these to be consistent with the rest and to protect against ill-formed policy. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Author: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Date: Tue Sep 16 21:47:22 2025 +0000 smc: Use __sk_dst_get() and dst_dev_rcu() in smc_vlan_by_tcpsk(). [ Upstream commit 0b0e4d51c6554e5ecc3f8cc73c2eaf12da21249a ] smc_vlan_by_tcpsk() fetches sk_dst_get(sk)->dev before RTNL and passes it to netdev_walk_all_lower_dev(), which is illegal. Also, smc_vlan_by_tcpsk_walk() does not require RTNL at all. Let's use __sk_dst_get(), dst_dev_rcu(), and netdev_walk_all_lower_dev_rcu(). Note that the returned value of smc_vlan_by_tcpsk() is not used in the caller. Fixes: 0cfdd8f92cac ("smc: connection and link group creation") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Author: Shuangpeng Bai <[email protected]> Date: Wed Aug 5 21:35:02 2026 -0400 USB: c67x00: fix use-after-free in c67x00_add_iso_urb() commit b1e24de475bf2d66fffc9103f3444b783527d55a upstream. When TD creation fails for the last packet of an isochronous URB, c67x00_add_iso_urb() gives the URB back before updating the endpoint scheduling state. c67x00_giveback_urb() frees the URB private data, and the completion callback may release the final URB reference. The following accesses to urbp->ep_data, urb->interval, and urbp->cnt can therefore use freed memory. Update next_frame and cnt before giving back the failed final packet, making the giveback the last operation that uses the URB and its private data. Fixes: e9b29ffc519b ("USB: add Cypress c67x00 OTG controller HCD driver") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Shuangpeng Bai <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Griffin Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Date: Mon Jul 13 17:43:53 2026 +0200 usb: core: Add lock to usb_wakeup_notification() commit e263e18a9e7b1ff3e7301f0801c6ff87c31adfb6 upstream. Add a spin lock to usb_wakeup notification to prevent a race condition with dereferencing freed memory. This could be hit by the xHCI driver as it calls this function from an IRQ and could race with the hub_disconnect() function, which properly grabs this lock to protect the state of the device. Assisted-by: gkh_clanker_t1000 Signed-off-by: Griffin Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Griffin Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Date: Wed Jul 22 10:17:39 2026 +0200 usb: core: Strengthen error handling in hub_hub_status() commit a29496745aa335d97f617385809583241e118610 upstream. Add additional error handling after the call to get_hub_status() in hub_hub_status(). get_hub_status() uses usb_control_msg() which does not verify that the message is the correct length, substituting it for usb_control_msg_recv() would also solve this issue but increase memory allocations. Instead, error handling is copied from the method used in hub_ext_port_status(), which shares the same flow of logic as hub_hub_status(). Assisted-by: gkh_clanker_t1000 Signed-off-by: Griffin Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Shuangpeng Bai <[email protected]> Date: Fri Aug 7 02:07:33 2026 -0400 usb: gadget: f_tcm: keep port count until LUN teardown completes commit c39d0916da47d94909391876c9e5bd429ea7b1b9 upstream. tcm_usbg_drop_nexus() permits session removal once tpg_port_count reaches zero. However, usbg_port_unlink() currently decrements that count from the fabric_pre_unlink() callback, before core_dev_del_lun() waits for active se_lun references to drain. If removal of the last LUN races a nexus removal, the latter can observe a zero port count and call target_remove_session(). This frees sess_cmd_map while an in-flight struct usbg_cmd, including its work item, can still be accessed. Overlapping the last-LUN unlink with nexus removal reproduces this lifetime violation as a DEBUG_OBJECTS "free active" warning for usbg_cmd_work, followed by a target-core BUG/Oops. The generic target-core unlink path has no callback after core_dev_del_lun() completes. Add an optional fabric_post_unlink() callback and use it for the f_tcm port count. The count now remains nonzero until core_dev_del_lun() has finished draining active LUN references, preventing nexus removal from freeing the session during command completion. Fixes: c52661d60f63 ("usb-gadget: Initial merge of target module for UASP + BOT") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Shuangpeng Bai <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Jiale Yao <[email protected]> Date: Sun Jul 26 00:27:51 2026 +0800 USB: serial: option: fix slab OOB read in interrupt URB callback commit 885d802f544ca7bfa8f3984d94233cce715bb6b3 upstream. The interrupt URB buffer is allocated in setup_port_interrupt_in() based on the endpoint's wMaxPacketSize: buffer_size = usb_endpoint_maxp(epd); port->interrupt_in_buffer = kmalloc(buffer_size, GFP_KERNEL); When a USB device declares wMaxPacketSize = 8 on its interrupt IN endpoint, the buffer is allocated from kmalloc-8 cache (exactly 8 bytes). If the device sends a short packet (actual_length < wMaxPacketSize), the URB completes with status == 0 and the callback proceeds to read: data[sizeof(struct usb_ctrlrequest)] which evaluates to data[8], accessing 1 byte beyond the allocated 8-byte buffer. This results in a slab out-of-bounds read. Fix this by adding the missing bounds check: first verify that the actual length is large enough to contain the struct usb_ctrlrequest header before accessing req_pkt->bRequestType and req_pkt->bRequest, and then verify that there is an additional byte for the modem signal state before reading data[sizeof(struct usb_ctrlrequest)] inside the conditional. Use sizeof(*req_pkt) instead of sizeof(struct usb_ctrlrequest) for consistency. Assisted-by: Claude:deepseek-v4-pro Signed-off-by: Jiale Yao <[email protected]> Fixes: 58cfe9113e48 ("[PATCH] USB: add Option Card driver") Cc: [email protected] # v2.6.12 [ johan: use dev_err(); split signals declaration and initialisation ] Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Johan Hovold <[email protected]> Date: Thu Aug 6 15:52:48 2026 +0200 USB: serial: spcp8x5: drop broken carrier detect support commit d37186bd95a07e334447f47274a38a311dad2172 upstream. The driver does not support modem status notifications and instead used to fetch the modem status once at open() and subsequently operate on and report stale state. As part of fixing this, a call to fetch the status was added to carrier_raised(), which does not work as that callback must not sleep (e.g. unlike tiocmget()). Drop the broken carrier detect support. Fixes: e1ed212d8593 ("USB: spcp8x5: add proper modem-status support") Cc: [email protected] # 3.10 Reported-by: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Miguel Peñaranda <[email protected]> Date: Mon Aug 10 14:12:09 2026 +0200 usb: usbfs: fix use-after-free of usb_device in usbdev_release() commit 0dd68b5d01d022fc9c5e71c82a82b0a94d3d0671 upstream. usbdev_release() drops its reference to the struct usb_device before draining the list of completed async URBs, but that drain path reads back through the same object: free_async() calls dec_usb_memory_use_count() for any URB whose buffer came from the usbfs mmap() region, and its first statement is bus_to_hcd(ps->dev->bus). After a disconnect the usbfs reference can be the last one, in which case usb_put_dev() frees the device and the subsequent loop reads offset 80 of freed memory and uses the result as a struct usb_hcd *, which hcd_buffer_free_pages() then dereferences. This is reachable by an unprivileged process that has read/write access to a /dev/bus/usb node: mmap() the fd, submit one URB with a buffer inside the mapping, wait for the device to be unplugged, then munmap() and close(). It reproduces on every attempt rather than being a race, because a live MAP_SHARED vma holds a reference on the struct file, so usbdev_release() cannot run until the last vma is gone and the freeing branch of dec_usb_memory_use_count() is always taken. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dec_usb_memory_use_count+0x3ae/0x410 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880122ee050 by task poc/769 CPU: 1 UID: 1000 PID: 769 Comm: poc Tainted: G B 6.12.94 #3 Call Trace: dec_usb_memory_use_count+0x3ae/0x410 free_async+0x2aa/0x4f0 usbdev_release+0x375/0x460 __fput+0x3ea/0xb50 __x64_sys_close+0x86/0x100 Allocated by task 11: usb_alloc_dev+0x55/0xd90 hub_event+0x2524/0x43d0 Freed by task 769: kfree+0x121/0x360 device_release+0xd2/0x280 usb_put_dev+0x23/0x30 usbdev_release+0x2d8/0x460 Release the device reference after the drain loop instead. Nothing between the two points requires it to have been dropped. Fixes: f7d34b445abc ("USB: Add support for usbfs zerocopy.") Cc: [email protected] Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5 Signed-off-by: Miguel Peñaranda <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Aleksandr Nogikh <[email protected]> Date: Thu Aug 6 15:26:51 2026 +0000 usb: usbtest: disable dynamic ID support commit 00e2071f6d5621a5ddea311a5e6b143ae6e474af upstream. The usbtest driver relies on the driver_info field of struct usb_device_id to point to a valid struct usbtest_info descriptor. This structure contains essential test configurations, such as endpoint addresses and test modes, which are required during probe. When a user dynamically adds a new device ID via the sysfs new_id interface without specifying a reference device, the USB core initializes driver_info to 0 (NULL). When a matching device is subsequently probed, usbtest_probe() unconditionally casts driver_info to a struct usbtest_info pointer and dereferences it, leading to a NULL pointer dereference crash: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] RIP: 0010:usbtest_probe+0x3b9/0x1280 drivers/usb/misc/usbtest.c:2822 Because usbtest strictly requires pre-defined usbtest_info descriptors to function, dynamic ID binding via sysfs is fundamentally unsupported for this driver. Fix this by setting .no_dynamic_id = 1 on usbtest_driver. This instructs the USB core to skip creating the new_id and remove_id sysfs interfaces for usbtest, preventing invalid dynamic ID entries from being created. Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7e1e5911f9eac50bedc7 Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Nogikh <[email protected]> Tested-by: [email protected] Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada <[email protected]> Date: Thu Jul 23 09:35:48 2026 +0000 xfrm: ah6: validate routing header segments_left commit 7bad4bda74dc4713f398d3b7624ff05478e3a568 upstream. AH6 rearranges routing-header addresses before computing or verifying the ICV. ipv6_rearrange_rthdr() assumes that segments_left is not larger than the number of addresses described by the routing header's hdrlen field. That assumption does not hold for raw IPv6 HDRINCL packets. A packet with hdrlen equal to 2 describes one address, but can carry an arbitrary segments_left value. With segments_left equal to 255, the function moves its address pointer 4,064 bytes backwards and passes a 4,064-byte length to memmove(), resulting in an out-of-bounds access. Validate the invariant locally before modifying the routing header or performing any address-pointer arithmetic, and propagate malformed-header errors to the existing AH6 input and output error paths. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: [email protected] Assisted-by: avom-custom-harness:gpt-5.5-qwen3.6-mod-mix Signed-off-by: Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Zhiling Zou <[email protected]> Date: Sat Jul 18 15:12:50 2026 +0800 xfrm: drop ESP-in-TCP packets with no ingress device commit e1d7c5ac1c246ce5775f604515de0a59fbf2116e upstream. ESP-in-TCP receives records through the TCP strparser. handle_esp() restores skb->dev from the saved skb_iif before passing the packet into the XFRM input path. Queued TCP data can be processed after the original ingress device has been removed, for example during veth or net namespace teardown. In that case dev_get_by_index_rcu() returns NULL. The XFRM IPv4 and IPv6 input paths both expect skb->dev to be valid while building the route lookup, so queued ESP-in-TCP data can dereference a NULL device. Drop the packet if the saved ingress device can no longer be resolved. Such a packet can no longer be routed through the normal XFRM receive path, and this preserves the existing behaviour for packets whose ingress device still exists. Fixes: e27cca96cd68 ("xfrm: add espintcp (RFC 8229)") Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: Vega <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Zhiling Zou <[email protected]> Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4 Reviewed-by: Ren Wei <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]> Date: Thu Jul 16 22:54:59 2026 +0200 xfrm: espintcp: fix UAF during close commit deb232e884877bf10b4ce2580909eedec986c284 upstream. ZDI reported and analyzed a race condition during close for espintcp sockets: espintcp_close() frees emsg->skb via kfree_skb() without holding any socket lock. Concurrently, the xfrm_trans_reinject work queue invokes esp_output_tcp_finish() -> espintcp_push_skb() -> espintcp_push_msgs() -> skb_send_sock_locked(), which reads the same skb as a data source. Fix this by adding a synchronize_rcu() call after resetting sk_prot, since esp_output_tcp_finish() runs under RCU and won't use a socket with sk_prot == &tcp_prot. Simply taking the socket lock in espintcp_close() could lead to leaks, if esp_output_tcp_finish() re-adds an skb in the slot we just freed. After this, the existing barrier() is no longer needed. Cc: [email protected] Fixes: e27cca96cd68 ("xfrm: add espintcp (RFC 8229)") Reported-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Breno Leitao <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Zihan Xi <[email protected]> Date: Tue Jul 28 01:30:32 2026 +0800 xfrm: fix xfrm_state_construct() auth-trunc leak commit c12cbf56320fb633484ee0ca1fb7d68d6b64b213 upstream. attach_auth_trunc() can allocate x->aalg while leaving x->props.aalgo at zero when the selected auth algorithm has no sadb_alg_id. One real case is cmac(aes). xfrm_state_construct() then treats !x->props.aalgo as "no auth algorithm attached yet" and calls attach_auth(). That overwrites x->aalg and loses the first allocation. Any later failure or teardown only frees the replacement pointer. Check whether x->aalg is already attached instead of inferring that state from x->props.aalgo. Fixes: 4447bb33f094 ("xfrm: Store aalg in xfrm_state with a user specified truncation length") Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: Vega <[email protected]> Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4 Signed-off-by: Zihan Xi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Lucas De Marchi <[email protected]> Date: Thu Aug 6 17:21:04 2026 +0300 xhci: dbgtty: Fix unregister on tty_alloc_driver() failure commit 25b8dfc13495a6c1cf4abacc8ef20196c7f20e5c upstream. Make sure to set dbc_tty_driver to NULL to match the check in dbc_tty_exit(). For that, make detached error handling path common to the other branch in the same function. Fixes: 4521f1613940 ("xhci: dbctty: split dbc tty driver registration and unregistration functions.") Cc: [email protected] # v5.10 Cc: Mathias Nyman <[email protected]> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Lucas De Marchi <[email protected]> Date: Thu Aug 6 17:21:03 2026 +0300 xhci: dbgtty: Fix unregister on tty_register_driver() failure commit a916fa66a43e10f63198b6ce978badffc678821a upstream. If tty_register_driver() fails, it drops the reference, but fails to set the global dbc_tty_driver to NULL, causing the unregister to be called again when module exits. On module unload dbc_tty_exit() only gates its cleanup on the driver pointer being non-NULL, so it operates on the already-freed driver: module_init(xhci_hcd_init) xhci_hcd_init() xhci_dbc_init() [return value ignored] dbc_tty_init() tty_register_driver() fails tty_driver_kref_put() -> driver freed (dbc_tty_driver left dangling) ... module_exit(xhci_hcd_fini) xhci_hcd_fini() xhci_dbc_exit() dbc_tty_exit() if (dbc_tty_driver) -> true (dangling) tty_unregister_driver() -> use-after-free Fixes: 4521f1613940 ("xhci: dbctty: split dbc tty driver registration and unregistration functions.") Cc: [email protected] # v5.10 Cc: Mathias Nyman <[email protected]> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>