Author: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Date: Sat Apr 11 21:02:30 2026 -0400 ACPI: EC: Evaluate _REG outside the EC scope more carefully [ Upstream commit 71bf41b8e913ec9fc91f0d39ab8fb320229ec604 ] Commit 60fa6ae6e6d0 ("ACPI: EC: Install address space handler at the namespace root") caused _REG methods for EC operation regions outside the EC device scope to be evaluated which on some systems leads to the evaluation of _REG methods in the scopes of device objects representing devices that are not present and not functional according to the _STA return values. Some of those device objects represent EC "alternatives" and if _REG is evaluated for their operation regions, the platform firmware may be confused and the platform may start to behave incorrectly. To avoid this problem, only evaluate _REG for EC operation regions located in the scopes of device objects representing known-to-be-present devices. For this purpose, partially revert commit 60fa6ae6e6d0 and trigger the evaluation of _REG for EC operation regions from acpi_bus_attach() for the known-valid devices. Fixes: 60fa6ae6e6d0 ("ACPI: EC: Install address space handler at the namespace root") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-acpi/[email protected] Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2298938 Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2302253 Reported-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]> Cc: All applicable <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Date: Sat Apr 11 21:02:29 2026 -0400 ACPICA: Add a depth argument to acpi_execute_reg_methods() [ Upstream commit cdf65d73e001fde600b18d7e45afadf559425ce5 ] A subsequent change will need to pass a depth argument to acpi_execute_reg_methods(), so prepare that function for it. No intentional functional changes. Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]> Cc: All applicable <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Stable-dep-of: 71bf41b8e913 ("ACPI: EC: Evaluate _REG outside the EC scope more carefully") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: John Johansen <[email protected]> Date: Sun Apr 12 23:39:18 2026 -0700 apparmor: fix differential encoding verification commit 39440b137546a3aa383cfdabc605fb73811b6093 upstream. Differential encoding allows loops to be created if it is abused. To prevent this the unpack should verify that a diff-encode chain terminates. Unfortunately the differential encode verification had two bugs. 1. it conflated states that had gone through check and already been marked, with states that were currently being checked and marked. This means that loops in the current chain being verified are treated as a chain that has already been verified. 2. the order bailout on already checked states compared current chain check iterators j,k instead of using the outer loop iterator i. Meaning a step backwards in states in the current chain verification was being mistaken for moving to an already verified state. Move to a double mark scheme where already verified states get a different mark, than the current chain being kept. This enables us to also drop the backwards verification check that was the cause of the second error as any already verified state is already marked. Fixes: 031dcc8f4e84 ("apparmor: dfa add support for state differential encoding") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <[email protected]> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: John Johansen <[email protected]> Date: Sun Apr 12 23:39:16 2026 -0700 apparmor: Fix double free of ns_name in aa_replace_profiles() commit 5df0c44e8f5f619d3beb871207aded7c78414502 upstream. if ns_name is NULL after 1071 error = aa_unpack(udata, &lh, &ns_name); and if ent->ns_name contains an ns_name in 1089 } else if (ent->ns_name) { then ns_name is assigned the ent->ns_name 1095 ns_name = ent->ns_name; however ent->ns_name is freed at 1262 aa_load_ent_free(ent); and then again when freeing ns_name at 1270 kfree(ns_name); Fix this by NULLing out ent->ns_name after it is transferred to ns_name Fixes: 145a0ef21c8e9 ("apparmor: fix blob compression when ns is forced on a policy load ") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <[email protected]> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Massimiliano Pellizzer <[email protected]> Date: Sun Apr 12 23:39:11 2026 -0700 apparmor: fix memory leak in verify_header commit e38c55d9f834e5b848bfed0f5c586aaf45acb825 upstream. The function sets `*ns = NULL` on every call, leaking the namespace string allocated in previous iterations when multiple profiles are unpacked. This also breaks namespace consistency checking since *ns is always NULL when the comparison is made. Remove the incorrect assignment. The caller (aa_unpack) initializes *ns to NULL once before the loop, which is sufficient. Fixes: dd51c8485763 ("apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <[email protected]> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Massimiliano Pellizzer <[email protected]> Date: Sun Apr 12 23:39:15 2026 -0700 apparmor: fix missing bounds check on DEFAULT table in verify_dfa() commit d352873bbefa7eb39995239d0b44ccdf8aaa79a4 upstream. The verify_dfa() function only checks DEFAULT_TABLE bounds when the state is not differentially encoded. When the verification loop traverses the differential encoding chain, it reads k = DEFAULT_TABLE[j] and uses k as an array index without validation. A malformed DFA with DEFAULT_TABLE[j] >= state_count, therefore, causes both out-of-bounds reads and writes. [ 57.179855] ================================================================== [ 57.180549] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in verify_dfa+0x59a/0x660 [ 57.180904] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888100eadec4 by task su/993 [ 57.181554] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 993 Comm: su Not tainted 6.19.0-rc7-next-20260127 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 57.181558] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 57.181563] Call Trace: [ 57.181572] <TASK> [ 57.181577] dump_stack_lvl+0x5e/0x80 [ 57.181596] print_report+0xc8/0x270 [ 57.181605] ? verify_dfa+0x59a/0x660 [ 57.181608] kasan_report+0x118/0x150 [ 57.181620] ? verify_dfa+0x59a/0x660 [ 57.181623] verify_dfa+0x59a/0x660 [ 57.181627] aa_dfa_unpack+0x1610/0x1740 [ 57.181629] ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x1d0/0x470 [ 57.181640] unpack_pdb+0x86d/0x46b0 [ 57.181647] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 57.181653] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 57.181656] ? aa_unpack_nameX+0x1a8/0x300 [ 57.181659] aa_unpack+0x20b0/0x4c30 [ 57.181662] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 57.181664] ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x33/0x700 [ 57.181681] ? kasan_save_track+0x4f/0x80 [ 57.181683] ? kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 [ 57.181686] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 [ 57.181688] ? __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x44a/0x780 [ 57.181693] ? aa_simple_write_to_buffer+0x54/0x130 [ 57.181697] ? policy_update+0x154/0x330 [ 57.181704] aa_replace_profiles+0x15a/0x1dd0 [ 57.181707] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 57.181710] ? __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x44a/0x780 [ 57.181712] ? aa_loaddata_alloc+0x77/0x140 [ 57.181715] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 57.181717] ? _copy_from_user+0x2a/0x70 [ 57.181730] policy_update+0x17a/0x330 [ 57.181733] profile_replace+0x153/0x1a0 [ 57.181735] ? rw_verify_area+0x93/0x2d0 [ 57.181740] vfs_write+0x235/0xab0 [ 57.181745] ksys_write+0xb0/0x170 [ 57.181748] do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x660 [ 57.181762] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 57.181765] RIP: 0033:0x7f6192792eb2 Remove the MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE condition to validate all DEFAULT_TABLE entries unconditionally. Fixes: 031dcc8f4e84 ("apparmor: dfa add support for state differential encoding") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <[email protected]> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: John Johansen <[email protected]> Date: Sun Apr 12 23:39:20 2026 -0700 apparmor: fix race between freeing data and fs accessing it commit 8e135b8aee5a06c52a4347a5a6d51223c6f36ba3 upstream. Backport for conflicts introdued by conversion from sha1 to sha256 introduced in e44a4dc4b36c ("apparmor: switch SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH from sha1 to sha256") AppArmor was putting the reference to i_private data on its end after removing the original entry from the file system. However the inode can and does live beyond that point and it is possible that some of the fs call back functions will be invoked after the reference has been put, which results in a race between freeing the data and accessing it through the fs. While the rawdata/loaddata is the most likely candidate to fail the race, as it has the fewest references. If properly crafted it might be possible to trigger a race for the other types stored in i_private. Fix this by moving the put of i_private referenced data to the correct place which is during inode eviction. Fixes: c961ee5f21b20 ("apparmor: convert from securityfs to apparmorfs for policy ns files") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Maxime Bélair <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: John Johansen <[email protected]> Date: Sun Apr 12 23:39:19 2026 -0700 apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference commit a0b7091c4de45a7325c8780e6934a894f92ac86b upstream. There is a race condition that leads to a use-after-free situation: because the rawdata inodes are not refcounted, an attacker can start open()ing one of the rawdata files, and at the same time remove the last reference to this rawdata (by removing the corresponding profile, for example), which frees its struct aa_loaddata; as a result, when seq_rawdata_open() is reached, i_private is a dangling pointer and freed memory is accessed. The rawdata inodes weren't refcounted to avoid a circular refcount and were supposed to be held by the profile rawdata reference. However during profile removal there is a window where the vfs and profile destruction race, resulting in the use after free. Fix this by moving to a double refcount scheme. Where the profile refcount on rawdata is used to break the circular dependency. Allowing for freeing of the rawdata once all inode references to the rawdata are put. Fixes: 5d5182cae401 ("apparmor: move to per loaddata files, instead of replicating in profiles") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Maxime Bélair <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <[email protected]> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Massimiliano Pellizzer <[email protected]> Date: Sun Apr 12 23:39:14 2026 -0700 apparmor: fix side-effect bug in match_char() macro usage commit 8756b68edae37ff546c02091989a4ceab3f20abd upstream. The match_char() macro evaluates its character parameter multiple times when traversing differential encoding chains. When invoked with *str++, the string pointer advances on each iteration of the inner do-while loop, causing the DFA to check different characters at each iteration and therefore skip input characters. This results in out-of-bounds reads when the pointer advances past the input buffer boundary. [ 94.984676] ================================================================== [ 94.985301] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in aa_dfa_match+0x5ae/0x760 [ 94.985655] Read of size 1 at addr ffff888100342000 by task file/976 [ 94.986319] CPU: 7 UID: 1000 PID: 976 Comm: file Not tainted 6.19.0-rc7-next-20260127 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 94.986322] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 94.986329] Call Trace: [ 94.986341] <TASK> [ 94.986347] dump_stack_lvl+0x5e/0x80 [ 94.986374] print_report+0xc8/0x270 [ 94.986384] ? aa_dfa_match+0x5ae/0x760 [ 94.986388] kasan_report+0x118/0x150 [ 94.986401] ? aa_dfa_match+0x5ae/0x760 [ 94.986405] aa_dfa_match+0x5ae/0x760 [ 94.986408] __aa_path_perm+0x131/0x400 [ 94.986418] aa_path_perm+0x219/0x2f0 [ 94.986424] apparmor_file_open+0x345/0x570 [ 94.986431] security_file_open+0x5c/0x140 [ 94.986442] do_dentry_open+0x2f6/0x1120 [ 94.986450] vfs_open+0x38/0x2b0 [ 94.986453] ? may_open+0x1e2/0x2b0 [ 94.986466] path_openat+0x231b/0x2b30 [ 94.986469] ? __x64_sys_openat+0xf8/0x130 [ 94.986477] do_file_open+0x19d/0x360 [ 94.986487] do_sys_openat2+0x98/0x100 [ 94.986491] __x64_sys_openat+0xf8/0x130 [ 94.986499] do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x660 [ 94.986515] ? count_memcg_events+0x15f/0x3c0 [ 94.986526] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 94.986540] ? handle_mm_fault+0x1639/0x1ef0 [ 94.986551] ? vma_start_read+0xf0/0x320 [ 94.986558] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 94.986561] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 94.986563] ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x50/0xe0 [ 94.986572] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 94.986574] ? arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x9/0xb0 [ 94.986587] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 94.986588] ? irqentry_exit+0x3c/0x590 [ 94.986595] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 94.986597] RIP: 0033:0x7fda4a79c3ea Fix by extracting the character value before invoking match_char, ensuring single evaluation per outer loop. Fixes: 074c1cd798cb ("apparmor: dfa move character match into a macro") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <[email protected]> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: John Johansen <[email protected]> Date: Sun Apr 12 23:39:17 2026 -0700 apparmor: fix unprivileged local user can do privileged policy management commit 6601e13e82841879406bf9f369032656f441a425 upstream. Backport for api changes introduced in 90c436a64a6e ("apparmor: pass cred through to audit info.") An unprivileged local user can load, replace, and remove profiles by opening the apparmorfs interfaces, via a confused deputy attack, by passing the opened fd to a privileged process, and getting the privileged process to write to the interface. This does require a privileged target that can be manipulated to do the write for the unprivileged process, but once such access is achieved full policy management is possible and all the possible implications that implies: removing confinement, DoS of system or target applications by denying all execution, by-passing the unprivileged user namespace restriction, to exploiting kernel bugs for a local privilege escalation. The policy management interface can not have its permissions simply changed from 0666 to 0600 because non-root processes need to be able to load policy to different policy namespaces. Instead ensure the task writing the interface has privileges that are a subset of the task that opened the interface. This is already done via policy for confined processes, but unconfined can delegate access to the opened fd, by-passing the usual policy check. Fixes: b7fd2c0340eac ("apparmor: add per policy ns .load, .replace, .remove interface files") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <[email protected]> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: John Johansen <[email protected]> Date: Sun Apr 12 23:39:13 2026 -0700 apparmor: fix: limit the number of levels of policy namespaces commit 306039414932c80f8420695a24d4fe10c84ccfb2 upstream. Currently the number of policy namespaces is not bounded relying on the user namespace limit. However policy namespaces aren't strictly tied to user namespaces and it is possible to create them and nest them arbitrarily deep which can be used to exhaust system resource. Hard cap policy namespaces to the same depth as user namespaces. Fixes: c88d4c7b049e8 ("AppArmor: core policy routines") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ryan Lee <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Massimiliano Pellizzer <[email protected]> Date: Sun Apr 12 23:39:12 2026 -0700 apparmor: replace recursive profile removal with iterative approach commit ab09264660f9de5d05d1ef4e225aa447c63a8747 upstream. The profile removal code uses recursion when removing nested profiles, which can lead to kernel stack exhaustion and system crashes. Reproducer: $ pf='a'; for ((i=0; i<1024; i++)); do echo -e "profile $pf { \n }" | apparmor_parser -K -a; pf="$pf//x"; done $ echo -n a > /sys/kernel/security/apparmor/.remove Replace the recursive __aa_profile_list_release() approach with an iterative approach in __remove_profile(). The function repeatedly finds and removes leaf profiles until the entire subtree is removed, maintaining the same removal semantic without recursion. Fixes: c88d4c7b049e ("AppArmor: core policy routines") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <[email protected]> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Massimiliano Pellizzer <[email protected]> Date: Sun Apr 12 23:39:10 2026 -0700 apparmor: validate DFA start states are in bounds in unpack_pdb commit 9063d7e2615f4a7ab321de6b520e23d370e58816 upstream. Backport for conflicts caused by ad596ea74e74 ("apparmor: group dfa policydb unpacking") which rearrange and consolidated the unpack. Start states are read from untrusted data and used as indexes into the DFA state tables. The aa_dfa_next() function call in unpack_pdb() will access dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE][start], and if the start state exceeds the number of states in the DFA, this results in an out-of-bound read. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in aa_dfa_next+0x2a1/0x360 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88811956fb90 by task su/1097 ... Reject policies with out-of-bounds start states during unpacking to prevent the issue. Fixes: ad5ff3db53c6 ("AppArmor: Add ability to load extended policy") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <[email protected]> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Shawn Guo <[email protected]> Date: Fri Feb 27 15:22:10 2026 +0800 arm64: dts: hisilicon: hi3798cv200: Add missing dma-ranges commit 1af997cad473d505248df6d9577183bb91f69670 upstream. Reboot starts failing on Poplar since commit 8424ecdde7df ("arm64: mm: Set ZONE_DMA size based on devicetree's dma-ranges"), which effectively changes zone_dma_bits from 30 to 32 for arm64 platforms that do not properly define dma-ranges in device tree. It's unclear how Poplar reboot gets broken by this change exactly, but a dma-ranges limiting zone_dma to the first 1 GB fixes the regression. Fixes: 2f20182ed670 ("arm64: dts: hisilicon: add dts files for hi3798cv200-poplar board") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Wei Xu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Shawn Guo <[email protected]> Date: Fri Feb 27 15:19:58 2026 +0800 arm64: dts: hisilicon: poplar: Correct PCIe reset GPIO polarity commit c1f2b0f2b5e37b2c27540a175aea2755a3799433 upstream. The PCIe reset GPIO on Poplar is actually active low. The active high worked before because kernel driver didn't respect the setting from DT. This is changed since commit 1d26a55fbeb9 ("PCI: histb: Switch to using gpiod API"), and thus PCIe on Poplar got brken since then. Fix the problem by correcting the polarity. Fixes: 32fa01761bd9 ("arm64: dts: hi3798cv200: enable PCIe support for poplar board") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Wei Xu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Haoze Xie <[email protected]> Date: Mon Apr 6 21:17:28 2026 +0800 batman-adv: hold claim backbone gateways by reference commit 82d8701b2c930d0e96b0dbc9115a218d791cb0d2 upstream. batadv_bla_add_claim() can replace claim->backbone_gw and drop the old gateway's last reference while readers still follow the pointer. The netlink claim dump path dereferences claim->backbone_gw->orig and takes claim->backbone_gw->crc_lock without pinning the underlying backbone gateway. batadv_bla_check_claim() still has the same naked pointer access pattern. Reuse batadv_bla_claim_get_backbone_gw() in both readers so they operate on a stable gateway reference until the read-side work is complete. This keeps the dump and claim-check paths aligned with the lifetime rules introduced for the other BLA claim readers. Fixes: 23721387c409 ("batman-adv: add basic bridge loop avoidance code") Fixes: 04f3f5bf1883 ("batman-adv: add B.A.T.M.A.N. Dump BLA claims via netlink") Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: Yifan Wu <[email protected]> Reported-by: Juefei Pu <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Xin Liu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Haoze Xie <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ao Zhou <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Ruide Cao <[email protected]> Date: Thu Apr 2 23:12:31 2026 +0800 batman-adv: reject oversized global TT response buffers commit 3a359bf5c61d52e7f09754108309d637532164a6 upstream. batadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_global_data() builds the allocation length for a global TT response in 16-bit temporaries. When a remote originator advertises a large enough global TT, the TT payload length plus the VLAN header offset can exceed 65535 and wrap before kmalloc(). The full-table response path still uses the original TT payload length when it fills tt_change, so the wrapped allocation is too small and batadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_global_data() writes past the end of the heap object before the later packet-size check runs. Fix this by rejecting TT responses whose TVLV value length cannot fit in the 16-bit TVLV payload length field. Fixes: 7ea7b4a14275 ("batman-adv: make the TT CRC logic VLAN specific") Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: Yifan Wu <[email protected]> Reported-by: Juefei Pu <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Xin Liu <[email protected]> Tested-by: Ren Wei <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ruide Cao <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Sebastian Brzezinka <[email protected]> Date: Wed Apr 1 12:10:07 2026 +0200 drm/i915/gt: fix refcount underflow in intel_engine_park_heartbeat commit 4c71fd099513bfa8acab529b626e1f0097b76061 upstream. A use-after-free / refcount underflow is possible when the heartbeat worker and intel_engine_park_heartbeat() race to release the same engine->heartbeat.systole request. The heartbeat worker reads engine->heartbeat.systole and calls i915_request_put() on it when the request is complete, but clears the pointer in a separate, non-atomic step. Concurrently, a request retirement on another CPU can drop the engine wakeref to zero, triggering __engine_park() -> intel_engine_park_heartbeat(). If the heartbeat timer is pending at that point, cancel_delayed_work() returns true and intel_engine_park_heartbeat() reads the stale non-NULL systole pointer and calls i915_request_put() on it again, causing a refcount underflow: ``` <4> [487.221889] Workqueue: i915-unordered engine_retire [i915] <4> [487.222640] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x68/0xb0 ... <4> [487.222707] Call Trace: <4> [487.222711] <TASK> <4> [487.222716] intel_engine_park_heartbeat.part.0+0x6f/0x80 [i915] <4> [487.223115] intel_engine_park_heartbeat+0x25/0x40 [i915] <4> [487.223566] __engine_park+0xb9/0x650 [i915] <4> [487.223973] ____intel_wakeref_put_last+0x2e/0xb0 [i915] <4> [487.224408] __intel_wakeref_put_last+0x72/0x90 [i915] <4> [487.224797] intel_context_exit_engine+0x7c/0x80 [i915] <4> [487.225238] intel_context_exit+0xf1/0x1b0 [i915] <4> [487.225695] i915_request_retire.part.0+0x1b9/0x530 [i915] <4> [487.226178] i915_request_retire+0x1c/0x40 [i915] <4> [487.226625] engine_retire+0x122/0x180 [i915] <4> [487.227037] process_one_work+0x239/0x760 <4> [487.227060] worker_thread+0x200/0x3f0 <4> [487.227068] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 <4> [487.227075] kthread+0x10d/0x150 <4> [487.227083] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 <4> [487.227092] ret_from_fork+0x3d4/0x480 <4> [487.227099] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 <4> [487.227107] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 <4> [487.227141] </TASK> ``` Fix this by replacing the non-atomic pointer read + separate clear with xchg() in both racing paths. xchg() is a single indivisible hardware instruction that atomically reads the old pointer and writes NULL. This guarantees only one of the two concurrent callers obtains the non-NULL pointer and performs the put, the other gets NULL and skips it. Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/i915/kernel/-/work_items/15880 Fixes: 058179e72e09 ("drm/i915/gt: Replace hangcheck by heartbeats") Cc: <[email protected]> # v5.5+ Signed-off-by: Sebastian Brzezinka <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Karas <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andi Shyti <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d4c1c14255688dd07cc8044973c4f032a8d1559e.1775038106.git.sebastian.brzezinka@intel.com (cherry picked from commit 13238dc0ee4f9ab8dafa2cca7295736191ae2f42) Signed-off-by: Joonas Lahtinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Lin.Cao <[email protected]> Date: Thu May 15 10:07:13 2025 +0800 drm/scheduler: signal scheduled fence when kill job commit 471db2c2d4f80ee94225a1ef246e4f5011733e50 upstream. When an entity from application B is killed, drm_sched_entity_kill() removes all jobs belonging to that entity through drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_work(). If application A's job depends on a scheduled fence from application B's job, and that fence is not properly signaled during the killing process, application A's dependency cannot be cleared. This leads to application A hanging indefinitely while waiting for a dependency that will never be resolved. Fix this issue by ensuring that scheduled fences are properly signaled when an entity is killed, allowing dependent applications to continue execution. Signed-off-by: Lin.Cao <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Philipp Stanner <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Christian König <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] [ Modified drm_sched_fence_scheduled(job->s_fence, NULL) to drm_sched_fence_scheduled(job->s_fence) for kernel 6.1.y ] Signed-off-by: Leon Chen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> Date: Tue Mar 31 14:16:23 2026 +0200 EDAC/mc: Fix error path ordering in edac_mc_alloc() commit 51520e03e70d6c73e33ee7cbe0319767d05764fe upstream. When the mci->pvt_info allocation in edac_mc_alloc() fails, the error path will call put_device() which will end up calling the device's release function. However, the init ordering is wrong such that device_initialize() happens *after* the failed allocation and thus the device itself and the release function pointer are not initialized yet when they're called: MCE: In-kernel MCE decoding enabled. ------------[ cut here ]------------ kobject: '(null)': is not initialized, yet kobject_put() is being called. WARNING: lib/kobject.c:734 at kobject_put, CPU#22: systemd-udevd CPU: 22 UID: 0 PID: 538 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 7.0.0-rc1+ #2 PREEMPT(full) RIP: 0010:kobject_put Call Trace: <TASK> edac_mc_alloc+0xbe/0xe0 [edac_core] amd64_edac_init+0x7a4/0xff0 [amd64_edac] ? __pfx_amd64_edac_init+0x10/0x10 [amd64_edac] do_one_initcall ... Reorder the calling sequence so that the device is initialized and thus the release function pointer is properly set before it can be used. This was found by Claude while reviewing another EDAC patch. Fixes: 0bbb265f7089 ("EDAC/mc: Get rid of silly one-shot struct allocation in edac_mc_alloc()") Reported-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-4.5 Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Qiuxu Zhuo <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Mikhail Gavrilov <[email protected]> Date: Tue Apr 7 12:50:31 2026 +0500 Input: uinput - fix circular locking dependency with ff-core commit 4cda78d6f8bf2b700529f2fbccb994c3e826d7c2 upstream. A lockdep circular locking dependency warning can be triggered reproducibly when using a force-feedback gamepad with uinput (for example, playing ELDEN RING under Wine with a Flydigi Vader 5 controller): ff->mutex -> udev->mutex -> input_mutex -> dev->mutex -> ff->mutex The cycle is caused by four lock acquisition paths: 1. ff upload: input_ff_upload() holds ff->mutex and calls uinput_dev_upload_effect() -> uinput_request_submit() -> uinput_request_send(), which acquires udev->mutex. 2. device create: uinput_ioctl_handler() holds udev->mutex and calls uinput_create_device() -> input_register_device(), which acquires input_mutex. 3. device register: input_register_device() holds input_mutex and calls kbd_connect() -> input_register_handle(), which acquires dev->mutex. 4. evdev release: evdev_release() calls input_flush_device() under dev->mutex, which calls input_ff_flush() acquiring ff->mutex. Fix this by introducing a new state_lock spinlock to protect udev->state and udev->dev access in uinput_request_send() instead of acquiring udev->mutex. The function only needs to atomically check device state and queue an input event into the ring buffer via uinput_dev_event() -- both operations are safe under a spinlock (ktime_get_ts64() and wake_up_interruptible() do not sleep). This breaks the ff->mutex -> udev->mutex link since a spinlock is a leaf in the lock ordering and cannot form cycles with mutexes. To keep state transitions visible to uinput_request_send(), protect writes to udev->state in uinput_create_device() and uinput_destroy_device() with the same state_lock spinlock. Additionally, move init_completion(&request->done) from uinput_request_send() to uinput_request_submit() before uinput_request_reserve_slot(). Once the slot is allocated, uinput_flush_requests() may call complete() on it at any time from the destroy path, so the completion must be initialised before the request becomes visible. Lock ordering after the fix: ff->mutex -> state_lock (spinlock, leaf) udev->mutex -> state_lock (spinlock, leaf) udev->mutex -> input_mutex -> dev->mutex -> ff->mutex (no back-edge) Fixes: ff462551235d ("Input: uinput - switch to the new FF interface") Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CABXGCsMoxag+kEwHhb7KqhuyxfmGGd0P=tHZyb1uKE0pLr8Hkg@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Mikhail Gavrilov <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]> Date: Tue Apr 7 22:16:27 2026 -0700 Input: uinput - take event lock when submitting FF request "event" commit ff14dafde15c11403fac61367a34fea08926e9ee upstream. To avoid racing with FF playback events and corrupting device's event queue take event_lock spinlock when calling uinput_dev_event() when submitting a FF upload or erase "event". Tested-by: Mikhail Gavrilov <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> Date: Wed Mar 25 20:29:20 2026 -0700 lib/crypto: chacha: Zeroize permuted_state before it leaves scope commit e5046823f8fa3677341b541a25af2fcb99a5b1e0 upstream. Since the ChaCha permutation is invertible, the local variable 'permuted_state' is sufficient to compute the original 'state', and thus the key, even after the permutation has been done. While the kernel is quite inconsistent about zeroizing secrets on the stack (and some prominent userspace crypto libraries don't bother at all since it's not guaranteed to work anyway), the kernel does try to do it as a best practice, especially in cases involving the RNG. Thus, explicitly zeroize 'permuted_state' before it goes out of scope. Fixes: c08d0e647305 ("crypto: chacha20 - Add a generic ChaCha20 stream cipher implementation") Cc: [email protected] Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Date: Sat Apr 18 10:35:59 2026 +0200 Linux 6.1.169 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Tested-by: Brett A C Sheffield <[email protected]> Tested-by: Florian Fainelli <[email protected]> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <[email protected]> Tested-by: Jon Hunter <[email protected]> Tested-by: Pavel Machek (CIP) <[email protected]> Tested-by: Pavel Machek (CIP) <[email protected]> Tested-by: Peter Schneider <[email protected]> Tested-by: Ron Economos <[email protected]> Tested-by: Francesco Dolcini <[email protected]> Tested-by: Shuah Khan <[email protected]> Tested-by: Miguel Ojeda <[email protected]> Tested-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]> Tested-by: Barry K. Nathan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <[email protected]> Date: Wed Aug 20 16:08:16 2025 +0000 media: uvcvideo: Mark invalid entities with id UVC_INVALID_ENTITY_ID [ Upstream commit 0e2ee70291e64a30fe36960c85294726d34a103e ] Per UVC 1.1+ specification 3.7.2, units and terminals must have a non-zero unique ID. ``` Each Unit and Terminal within the video function is assigned a unique identification number, the Unit ID (UID) or Terminal ID (TID), contained in the bUnitID or bTerminalID field of the descriptor. The value 0x00 is reserved for undefined ID, ``` If we add a new entity with id 0 or a duplicated ID, it will be marked as UVC_INVALID_ENTITY_ID. In a previous attempt commit 3dd075fe8ebb ("media: uvcvideo: Require entities to have a non-zero unique ID"), we ignored all the invalid units, this broke a lot of non-compatible cameras. Hopefully we are more lucky this time. This also prevents some syzkaller reproducers from triggering warnings due to a chain of entities referring to themselves. In one particular case, an Output Unit is connected to an Input Unit, both with the same ID of 1. But when looking up for the source ID of the Output Unit, that same entity is found instead of the input entity, which leads to such warnings. In another case, a backward chain was considered finished as the source ID was 0. Later on, that entity was found, but its pads were not valid. Here is a sample stack trace for one of those cases. [ 20.650953] usb 1-1: new high-speed USB device number 2 using dummy_hcd [ 20.830206] usb 1-1: Using ep0 maxpacket: 8 [ 20.833501] usb 1-1: config 0 descriptor?? [ 21.038518] usb 1-1: string descriptor 0 read error: -71 [ 21.038893] usb 1-1: Found UVC 0.00 device <unnamed> (2833:0201) [ 21.039299] uvcvideo 1-1:0.0: Entity type for entity Output 1 was not initialized! [ 21.041583] uvcvideo 1-1:0.0: Entity type for entity Input 1 was not initialized! [ 21.042218] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 21.042536] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9 at drivers/media/mc/mc-entity.c:1147 media_create_pad_link+0x2c4/0x2e0 [ 21.043195] Modules linked in: [ 21.043535] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7-00030-g3480e43aeccf #444 [ 21.044101] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 21.044639] Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event [ 21.045100] RIP: 0010:media_create_pad_link+0x2c4/0x2e0 [ 21.045508] Code: fe e8 20 01 00 00 b8 f4 ff ff ff 48 83 c4 30 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc 0f 0b eb e9 0f 0b eb 0a 0f 0b eb 06 <0f> 0b eb 02 0f 0b b8 ea ff ff ff eb d4 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 [ 21.046801] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000004b318 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 21.047227] RAX: ffff888004e5d458 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff818fccf1 [ 21.047719] RDX: 000000000000007b RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888004313290 [ 21.048241] RBP: ffff888004313290 R08: 0001ffffffffffff R09: 0000000000000000 [ 21.048701] R10: 0000000000000013 R11: 0001888004313290 R12: 0000000000000003 [ 21.049138] R13: ffff888004313080 R14: ffff888004313080 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 21.049648] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88803ec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 21.050271] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 21.050688] CR2: 0000592cc27635b0 CR3: 000000000431c000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 [ 21.051136] PKRU: 55555554 [ 21.051331] Call Trace: [ 21.051480] <TASK> [ 21.051611] ? __warn+0xc4/0x210 [ 21.051861] ? media_create_pad_link+0x2c4/0x2e0 [ 21.052252] ? report_bug+0x11b/0x1a0 [ 21.052540] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x31/0x40 [ 21.052901] ? handle_bug+0x3d/0x70 [ 21.053197] ? exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x50 [ 21.053511] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 [ 21.053924] ? media_create_pad_link+0x91/0x2e0 [ 21.054364] ? media_create_pad_link+0x2c4/0x2e0 [ 21.054834] ? media_create_pad_link+0x91/0x2e0 [ 21.055131] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1e/0x40 [ 21.055441] ? __v4l2_device_register_subdev+0x202/0x210 [ 21.055837] uvc_mc_register_entities+0x358/0x400 [ 21.056144] uvc_register_chains+0x1fd/0x290 [ 21.056413] uvc_probe+0x380e/0x3dc0 [ 21.056676] ? __lock_acquire+0x5aa/0x26e0 [ 21.056946] ? find_held_lock+0x33/0xa0 [ 21.057196] ? kernfs_activate+0x70/0x80 [ 21.057533] ? usb_match_dynamic_id+0x1b/0x70 [ 21.057811] ? find_held_lock+0x33/0xa0 [ 21.058047] ? usb_match_dynamic_id+0x55/0x70 [ 21.058330] ? lock_release+0x124/0x260 [ 21.058657] ? usb_match_one_id_intf+0xa2/0x100 [ 21.058997] usb_probe_interface+0x1ba/0x330 [ 21.059399] really_probe+0x1ba/0x4c0 [ 21.059662] __driver_probe_device+0xb2/0x180 [ 21.059944] driver_probe_device+0x5a/0x100 [ 21.060170] __device_attach_driver+0xe9/0x160 [ 21.060427] ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10 [ 21.060872] bus_for_each_drv+0xa9/0x100 [ 21.061312] __device_attach+0xed/0x190 [ 21.061812] device_initial_probe+0xe/0x20 [ 21.062229] bus_probe_device+0x4d/0xd0 [ 21.062590] device_add+0x308/0x590 [ 21.062912] usb_set_configuration+0x7b6/0xaf0 [ 21.063403] usb_generic_driver_probe+0x36/0x80 [ 21.063714] usb_probe_device+0x7b/0x130 [ 21.063936] really_probe+0x1ba/0x4c0 [ 21.064111] __driver_probe_device+0xb2/0x180 [ 21.064577] driver_probe_device+0x5a/0x100 [ 21.065019] __device_attach_driver+0xe9/0x160 [ 21.065403] ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10 [ 21.065820] bus_for_each_drv+0xa9/0x100 [ 21.066094] __device_attach+0xed/0x190 [ 21.066535] device_initial_probe+0xe/0x20 [ 21.066992] bus_probe_device+0x4d/0xd0 [ 21.067250] device_add+0x308/0x590 [ 21.067501] usb_new_device+0x347/0x610 [ 21.067817] hub_event+0x156b/0x1e30 [ 21.068060] ? process_scheduled_works+0x48b/0xaf0 [ 21.068337] process_scheduled_works+0x5a3/0xaf0 [ 21.068668] worker_thread+0x3cf/0x560 [ 21.068932] ? kthread+0x109/0x1b0 [ 21.069133] kthread+0x197/0x1b0 [ 21.069343] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 21.069598] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 21.069908] ret_from_fork+0x32/0x40 [ 21.070169] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 21.070424] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 21.070737] </TASK> Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=0584f746fde3d52b4675 Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=dd320d114deb3f5bb79b Reported-by: Youngjun Lee <[email protected]> Fixes: a3fbc2e6bb05 ("media: mc-entity.c: use WARN_ON, validate link pads") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Ricardo Ribalda <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Author: Ricardo Ribalda <[email protected]> Date: Tue Oct 21 10:36:17 2025 +0000 media: uvcvideo: Use heuristic to find stream entity [ Upstream commit 758dbc756aad429da11c569c0d067f7fd032bcf7 ] Some devices, like the Grandstream GUV3100 webcam, have an invalid UVC descriptor where multiple entities share the same ID, this is invalid and makes it impossible to make a proper entity tree without heuristics. We have recently introduced a change in the way that we handle invalid entities that has caused a regression on broken devices. Implement a new heuristic to handle these devices properly. Reported-by: Angel4005 <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-media/CAOzBiVuS7ygUjjhCbyWg-KiNx+HFTYnqH5+GJhd6cYsNLT=DaA@mail.gmail.com/ Fixes: 0e2ee70291e6 ("media: uvcvideo: Mark invalid entities with id UVC_INVALID_ENTITY_ID") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Author: Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]> Date: Fri Apr 10 01:52:57 2026 +0100 MIPS: Always record SEGBITS in cpu_data.vmbits commit 8374c2cb83b95b3c92f129fd56527225c20a058c upstream. With a 32-bit kernel running on 64-bit MIPS hardware the hardcoded value of `cpu_vmbits' only records the size of compatibility useg and does not reflect the size of native xuseg or the complete range of values allowed in the VPN2 field of TLB entries. An upcoming change will need the actual VPN2 value range permitted even in 32-bit kernel configurations, so always include the `vmbits' member in `struct cpuinfo_mips' and probe for SEGBITS when running on 64-bit hardware and resorting to the currently hardcoded value of 31 on 32-bit processors. No functional change for users of `cpu_vmbits'. Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Author: Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]> Date: Fri Apr 10 01:52:59 2026 +0100 MIPS: mm: Rewrite TLB uniquification for the hidden bit feature commit 540760b77b8fc49d39d1b2b76196e5ec57711a32 upstream. Before the introduction of the EHINV feature, which lets software mark TLB entries invalid, certain older implementations of the MIPS ISA were equipped with an analogous bit, as a vendor extension, which however is hidden from software and only ever set at reset, and then any software write clears it, making the intended TLB entry valid. This feature makes it unsafe to read a TLB entry with TLBR, modify the page mask, and write the entry back with TLBWI, because this operation will implicitly clear the hidden bit and this may create a duplicate entry, as with the presence of the hidden bit there is no guarantee all the entries across the TLB are unique each. Usually the firmware has already uniquified TLB entries before handing control over, in which case we only need to guarantee at bootstrap no clash will happen with the VPN2 values chosen in local_flush_tlb_all(). However with systems such as Mikrotik RB532 we get handed the TLB as at reset, with the hidden bit set across the entries and possibly duplicate entries present. This then causes a machine check exception when page sizes are reset in r4k_tlb_uniquify() and prevents the system from booting. Rewrite the algorithm used in r4k_tlb_uniquify() then such as to avoid the reuse of ASID/VPN values across the TLB. Get rid of global entries first as they may be blocking the entire address space, e.g. 16 256MiB pages will exhaust the whole address space of a 32-bit CPU and a single big page can exhaust the 32-bit compatibility space on a 64-bit CPU. Details of the algorithm chosen are given across the code itself. Fixes: 9f048fa48740 ("MIPS: mm: Prevent a TLB shutdown on initial uniquification") Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] # v6.18+ Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Author: Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]> Date: Fri Apr 10 01:52:58 2026 +0100 MIPS: mm: Suppress TLB uniquification on EHINV hardware commit 74283cfe216392c7b776ebf6045b5b15ed9dffcd upstream. Hardware that supports the EHINV feature, mandatory for R6 ISA and FTLB implementation, lets software mark TLB entries invalid, which eliminates the need to ensure no duplicate matching entries are ever created. This feature is already used by local_flush_tlb_all(), via the UNIQUE_ENTRYHI macro, making the preceding call to r4k_tlb_uniquify() superfluous. The next change will also modify uniquification code such that it'll become incompatible with the FTLB and MMID features, as well as MIPSr6 CPUs that do not implement 4KiB pages. Therefore prevent r4k_tlb_uniquify() from being used on EHINV hardware, as denoted by `cpu_has_tlbinv'. Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Author: Johan Hovold <[email protected]> Date: Fri Mar 27 11:52:05 2026 +0100 mmc: vub300: fix NULL-deref on disconnect commit dff34ef879c5e73298443956a8b391311ba78d57 upstream. Make sure to deregister the controller before dropping the reference to the driver data on disconnect to avoid NULL-pointer dereferences or use-after-free. Fixes: 88095e7b473a ("mmc: Add new VUB300 USB-to-SD/SDIO/MMC driver") Cc: [email protected] # 3.0+ Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Jiayuan Chen <[email protected]> Date: Mon Apr 6 11:15:10 2026 +0800 mptcp: fix slab-use-after-free in __inet_lookup_established commit 9b55b253907e7431210483519c5ad711a37dafa1 upstream. The ehash table lookups are lockless and rely on SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU to guarantee socket memory stability during RCU read-side critical sections. Both tcp_prot and tcpv6_prot have their slab caches created with this flag via proto_register(). However, MPTCP's mptcp_subflow_init() copies tcpv6_prot into tcpv6_prot_override during inet_init() (fs_initcall, level 5), before inet6_init() (module_init/device_initcall, level 6) has called proto_register(&tcpv6_prot). At that point, tcpv6_prot.slab is still NULL, so tcpv6_prot_override.slab remains NULL permanently. This causes MPTCP v6 subflow child sockets to be allocated via kmalloc (falling into kmalloc-4k) instead of the TCPv6 slab cache. The kmalloc-4k cache lacks SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, so when these sockets are freed without SOCK_RCU_FREE (which is cleared for child sockets by design), the memory can be immediately reused. Concurrent ehash lookups under rcu_read_lock can then access freed memory, triggering a slab-use-after-free in __inet_lookup_established. Fix this by splitting the IPv6-specific initialization out of mptcp_subflow_init() into a new mptcp_subflow_v6_init(), called from mptcp_proto_v6_init() before protocol registration. This ensures tcpv6_prot_override.slab correctly inherits the SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU slab cache. Fixes: b19bc2945b40 ("mptcp: implement delegated actions") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Michael Guralnik <[email protected]> Date: Fri Apr 3 12:17:56 2026 +0300 net/mlx5: Update the list of the PCI supported devices commit a9d4f4f6e65e0bf9bbddedecc84d67249991979c upstream. Add the upcoming ConnectX-10 NVLink-C2C device ID to the table of supported PCI device IDs. Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Michael Guralnik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Patrisious Haddad <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Muhammad Alifa Ramdhan <[email protected]> Date: Fri Apr 3 09:36:17 2026 +0800 net/tls: fix use-after-free in -EBUSY error path of tls_do_encryption commit a9b8b18364fffce4c451e6f6fd218fa4ab646705 upstream. The -EBUSY handling in tls_do_encryption(), introduced by commit 859054147318 ("net: tls: handle backlogging of crypto requests"), has a use-after-free due to double cleanup of encrypt_pending and the scatterlist entry. When crypto_aead_encrypt() returns -EBUSY, the request is enqueued to the cryptd backlog and the async callback tls_encrypt_done() will be invoked upon completion. That callback unconditionally restores the scatterlist entry (sge->offset, sge->length) and decrements ctx->encrypt_pending. However, if tls_encrypt_async_wait() returns an error, the synchronous error path in tls_do_encryption() performs the same cleanup again, double-decrementing encrypt_pending and double-restoring the scatterlist. The double-decrement corrupts the encrypt_pending sentinel (initialized to 1), making tls_encrypt_async_wait() permanently skip the wait for pending async callbacks. A subsequent sendmsg can then free the tls_rec via bpf_exec_tx_verdict() while a cryptd callback is still pending, resulting in a use-after-free when the callback fires on the freed record. Fix this by skipping the synchronous cleanup when the -EBUSY async wait returns an error, since the callback has already handled encrypt_pending and sge restoration. Fixes: 859054147318 ("net: tls: handle backlogging of crypto requests") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Muhammad Alifa Ramdhan <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: David Carlier <[email protected]> Date: Wed Apr 1 22:12:18 2026 +0100 net: altera-tse: fix skb leak on DMA mapping error in tse_start_xmit() commit 6dede3967619b5944003227a5d09fdc21ed57d10 upstream. When dma_map_single() fails in tse_start_xmit(), the function returns NETDEV_TX_OK without freeing the skb. Since NETDEV_TX_OK tells the stack the packet was consumed, the skb is never freed, leaking memory on every DMA mapping failure. Add dev_kfree_skb_any() before returning to properly free the skb. Fixes: bbd2190ce96d ("Altera TSE: Add main and header file for Altera Ethernet Driver") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: David Carlier <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Pengpeng Hou <[email protected]> Date: Thu Apr 2 15:12:07 2026 +0800 net: qualcomm: qca_uart: report the consumed byte on RX skb allocation failure commit b76254c55dc8f23edc089027dd3f8792554c69fb upstream. qca_tty_receive() consumes each input byte before checking whether a completed frame needs a fresh receive skb. When the current byte completes a frame, the driver delivers that frame and then allocates a new skb for the next one. If that allocation fails, the current code returns i even though data[i] has already been consumed and may already have completed the delivered frame. Since serdev interprets the return value as the number of accepted bytes, this under-reports progress by one byte and can replay the final byte of the completed frame into a fresh parser state on the next call. Return i + 1 in that failure path so the accepted-byte count matches the actual receive-state progress. Fixes: dfc768fbe618 ("net: qualcomm: add QCA7000 UART driver") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Pengpeng Hou <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Stefan Wahren <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Date: Sun Apr 12 08:55:17 2026 -0400 net: rfkill: prevent unlimited numbers of rfkill events from being created [ Upstream commit ea245d78dec594372e27d8c79616baf49e98a4a1 ] Userspace can create an unlimited number of rfkill events if the system is so configured, while not consuming them from the rfkill file descriptor, causing a potential out of memory situation. Prevent this from bounding the number of pending rfkill events at a "large" number (i.e. 1000) to prevent abuses like this. Cc: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> Reported-by: Yuan Tan <[email protected]> Reported-by: Yifan Wu <[email protected]> Reported-by: Juefei Pu <[email protected]> Reported-by: Xin Liu <[email protected]> Cc: stable <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/2026033013-disfigure-scroll-e25e@gregkh Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> Date: Sun Apr 12 08:55:16 2026 -0400 net: rfkill: reduce data->mtx scope in rfkill_fop_open [ Upstream commit f2ac54ebf85615a6d78f5eb213a8bbeeb17ebe5d ] In syzbot runs, lockdep reports that there's a (potential) deadlock here of data->mtx being locked recursively. This isn't really a deadlock since they are different instances, but lockdep cannot know, and teaching it would be far more difficult than other fixes. At the same time we don't even really _need_ the mutex to be locked in rfkill_fop_open(), since we're modifying only a completely fresh instance of 'data' (struct rfkill_data) that's not yet added to the global list. However, to avoid any reordering etc. within the globally locked section, and to make the code look more symmetric, we should still lock the data->events list manipulation, but also need to lock _only_ that. So do that. Reported-by: [email protected] Fixes: 2c3dfba4cf84 ("rfkill: sync before userspace visibility/changes") Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> Stable-dep-of: ea245d78dec5 ("net: rfkill: prevent unlimited numbers of rfkill events from being created") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Tyllis Xu <[email protected]> Date: Tue Mar 31 23:47:07 2026 -0500 net: stmmac: fix integer underflow in chain mode commit 51f4e090b9f87b40c21b6daadb5c06e6c0a07b67 upstream. The jumbo_frm() chain-mode implementation unconditionally computes len = nopaged_len - bmax; where nopaged_len = skb_headlen(skb) (linear bytes only) and bmax is BUF_SIZE_8KiB or BUF_SIZE_2KiB. However, the caller stmmac_xmit() decides to invoke jumbo_frm() based on skb->len (total length including page fragments): is_jumbo = stmmac_is_jumbo_frm(priv, skb->len, enh_desc); When a packet has a small linear portion (nopaged_len <= bmax) but a large total length due to page fragments (skb->len > bmax), the subtraction wraps as an unsigned integer, producing a huge len value (~0xFFFFxxxx). This causes the while (len != 0) loop to execute hundreds of thousands of iterations, passing skb->data + bmax * i pointers far beyond the skb buffer to dma_map_single(). On IOMMU-less SoCs (the typical deployment for stmmac), this maps arbitrary kernel memory to the DMA engine, constituting a kernel memory disclosure and potential memory corruption from hardware. Fix this by introducing a buf_len local variable clamped to min(nopaged_len, bmax). Computing len = nopaged_len - buf_len is then always safe: it is zero when the linear portion fits within a single descriptor, causing the while (len != 0) loop to be skipped naturally, and the fragment loop in stmmac_xmit() handles page fragments afterward. Fixes: 286a83721720 ("stmmac: add CHAINED descriptor mode support (V4)") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Tyllis Xu <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Tuan Do <[email protected]> Date: Fri Apr 3 00:33:17 2026 -0700 netfilter: nft_ct: fix use-after-free in timeout object destroy commit f8dca15a1b190787bbd03285304b569631160eda upstream. nft_ct_timeout_obj_destroy() frees the timeout object with kfree() immediately after nf_ct_untimeout(), without waiting for an RCU grace period. Concurrent packet processing on other CPUs may still hold RCU-protected references to the timeout object obtained via rcu_dereference() in nf_ct_timeout_data(). Add an rcu_head to struct nf_ct_timeout and use kfree_rcu() to defer freeing until after an RCU grace period, matching the approach already used in nfnetlink_cttimeout.c. KASAN report: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nf_conntrack_tcp_packet+0x1381/0x29d0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881035fe19c by task exploit/80 Call Trace: nf_conntrack_tcp_packet+0x1381/0x29d0 nf_conntrack_in+0x612/0x8b0 nf_hook_slow+0x70/0x100 __ip_local_out+0x1b2/0x210 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x722/0x1580 __sys_sendto+0x2d8/0x320 Allocated by task 75: nft_ct_timeout_obj_init+0xf6/0x290 nft_obj_init+0x107/0x1b0 nf_tables_newobj+0x680/0x9c0 nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xc29/0xe00 Freed by task 26: nft_obj_destroy+0x3f/0xa0 nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x51c/0x5c0 process_one_work+0x2c4/0x5a0 Fixes: 7e0b2b57f01d ("netfilter: nft_ct: add ct timeout support") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Tuan Do <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Date: Mon Apr 13 04:32:47 2026 +0000 netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: do not rely on ZERO_SIZE_PTR commit 07ace0bbe03b3d8e85869af1dec5e4087b1d57b8 upstream pipapo relies on kmalloc(0) returning ZERO_SIZE_PTR (i.e., not NULL but pointer is invalid). Rework this to not call slab allocator when we'd request a 0-byte allocation. Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mukul Sikka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Brennan Lamoreaux <[email protected]> [Keerthana: In older stable branches (v6.6 and earlier), the allocation logic in pipapo_clone() still relies on `src->rules` rather than `src->rules_alloc` (introduced in v6.9 via 9f439bd6ef4f). Consequently, the previously backported INT_MAX clamping check uses `src->rules`. This patch correctly moves that `src->rules > (INT_MAX / ...)` check inside the new `if (src->rules > 0)` block] Signed-off-by: Keerthana K <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Pengpeng Hou <[email protected]> Date: Sun Apr 5 08:40:00 2026 +0800 nfc: pn533: allocate rx skb before consuming bytes commit c71ba669b570c7b3f86ec875be222ea11dacb352 upstream. pn532_receive_buf() reports the number of accepted bytes to the serdev core. The current code consumes bytes into recv_skb and may already hand a complete frame to pn533_recv_frame() before allocating a fresh receive buffer. If that alloc_skb() fails, the callback returns 0 even though it has already consumed bytes, and it leaves recv_skb as NULL for the next receive callback. That breaks the receive_buf() accounting contract and can also lead to a NULL dereference on the next skb_put_u8(). Allocate the receive skb lazily before consuming the next byte instead. If allocation fails, return the number of bytes already accepted. Fixes: c656aa4c27b1 ("nfc: pn533: add UART phy driver") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Pengpeng Hou <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Date: Sat Apr 11 21:02:28 2026 -0400 Revert "ACPI: EC: Evaluate orphan _REG under EC device" [ Upstream commit 779bac9994452f6a894524f70c00cfb0cd4b6364 ] This reverts commit 0e6b6dedf168 ("Revert "ACPI: EC: Evaluate orphan _REG under EC device") because the problem addressed by it will be addressed differently in what follows. Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]> Cc: All applicable <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Stable-dep-of: 71bf41b8e913 ("ACPI: EC: Evaluate _REG outside the EC scope more carefully") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <[email protected]> Date: Sun Apr 12 16:02:51 2026 -0400 Revert "mptcp: add needs_id for netlink appending addr" [ Upstream commit 8e2760eaab778494fc1fa257031e0e1799647f46 ] This commit was originally adding the ability to add MPTCP endpoints with ID 0 by accident. The in-kernel PM, handling MPTCP endpoints at the net namespace level, is not supposed to handle endpoints with such ID, because this ID 0 is reserved to the initial subflow, as mentioned in the MPTCPv1 protocol [1], a per-connection setting. Note that 'ip mptcp endpoint add id 0' stops early with an error, but other tools might still request the in-kernel PM to create MPTCP endpoints with this restricted ID 0. In other words, it was wrong to call the mptcp_pm_has_addr_attr_id helper to check whether the address ID attribute is set: if it was set to 0, a new MPTCP endpoint would be created with ID 0, which is not expected, and might cause various issues later. Fixes: 584f38942626 ("mptcp: add needs_id for netlink appending addr") Cc: [email protected] Link: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8684#section-3.2-9 [1] Reviewed-by: Geliang Tang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260407-net-mptcp-revert-pm-needs-id-v2-1-7a25cbc324f8@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> [ applied changes to net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c instead of renamed net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Manivannan Sadhasivam <[email protected]> Date: Tue Mar 31 14:44:55 2026 +0530 Revert "PCI: Enable ACS after configuring IOMMU for OF platforms" This reverts commit 5d57164c0ab0ac5c99eca49c577994bfbca70a2a which is commit c41e2fb67e26b04d919257875fa954aa5f6e392e upstream. The original commit attempted to enable ACS in pci_dma_configure() prior to IOMMU group assignment in iommu_init_device() to fix the ACS enablement issue for OF platforms. But that assumption doesn't hold true for kernel versions prior to v6.15, because on these older kernels, pci_dma_configure() is called *after* iommu_init_device(). So the IOMMU groups are already created before the ACS gets enabled. This causes the devices that should have been split into separate groups by ACS, getting merged into one group, thereby breaking the IOMMU isolation as reported on the AMD machines. So revert the offending commit to restore the IOMMU group assignment on those affected machines. It should be noted that ACS has never really worked on kernel versions prior to v6.15, so the revert doesn't make any difference for OF platforms. Reported-by: John Hancock <[email protected]> Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=221234 Fixes: b20b659c2c6a ("PCI: Enable ACS after configuring IOMMU for OF platforms") Cc: Linux kernel regressions list <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/regressions/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> Date: Sun Apr 12 08:55:15 2026 -0400 rfkill: sync before userspace visibility/changes [ Upstream commit 2c3dfba4cf84ac4f306cc6653b37b6dd6859ae9d ] If userspace quickly opens /dev/rfkill after a new instance was created, it might see the old state of the instance from before the sync work runs and may even _change_ the state, only to have the sync work change it again. Fix this by doing the sync inline where needed, not just for /dev/rfkill but also for sysfs. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> Stable-dep-of: ea245d78dec5 ("net: rfkill: prevent unlimited numbers of rfkill events from being created") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Bo Liu <[email protected]> Date: Sun Apr 12 08:55:14 2026 -0400 rfkill: Use sysfs_emit() to instead of sprintf() [ Upstream commit 796703baead0c2862f7f2ebb9b177590af533035 ] Follow the advice of the Documentation/filesystems/sysfs.rst and show() should only use sysfs_emit() or sysfs_emit_at() when formatting the value to be returned to user space. Signed-off-by: Bo Liu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> Stable-dep-of: ea245d78dec5 ("net: rfkill: prevent unlimited numbers of rfkill events from being created") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: David Howells <[email protected]> Date: Wed Apr 8 13:12:43 2026 +0100 rxrpc: Fix key/keyring checks in setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY/KEYRING) commit 2afd86ccbb2082a3c4258aea8c07e5bb6267bc2f upstream. An AF_RXRPC socket can be both client and server at the same time. When sending new calls (ie. it's acting as a client), it uses rx->key to set the security, and when accepting incoming calls (ie. it's acting as a server), it uses rx->securities. setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY) sets rx->key to point to an rxrpc-type key and setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEYRING) sets rx->securities to point to a keyring of rxrpc_s-type keys. Now, it should be possible to use both rx->key and rx->securities on the same socket - but for userspace AF_RXRPC sockets rxrpc_setsockopt() prevents that. Fix this by: (1) Remove the incorrect check rxrpc_setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEYRING) makes on rx->key. (2) Move the check that rxrpc_setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY) makes on rx->key down into rxrpc_request_key(). (3) Remove rxrpc_request_key()'s check on rx->securities. This (in combination with a previous patch) pushes the checks down into the functions that set those pointers and removes the cross-checks that prevent both key and keyring being set. Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both") Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected] Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> cc: Marc Dionne <[email protected]> cc: Anderson Nascimento <[email protected]> cc: Luxiao Xu <[email protected]> cc: Yuan Tan <[email protected]> cc: Simon Horman <[email protected]> cc: [email protected] cc: [email protected] Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Luxiao Xu <[email protected]> Date: Wed Apr 8 13:12:42 2026 +0100 rxrpc: fix reference count leak in rxrpc_server_keyring() commit f125846ee79fcae537a964ce66494e96fa54a6de upstream. This patch fixes a reference count leak in rxrpc_server_keyring() by checking if rx->securities is already set. Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both") Reported-by: Yifan Wu <[email protected]> Reported-by: Juefei Pu <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Xin Liu <[email protected]> Tested-by: Ren Wei <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luxiao Xu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> cc: Marc Dionne <[email protected]> cc: Simon Horman <[email protected]> cc: [email protected] cc: [email protected] Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Andrea Mayer <[email protected]> Date: Sun Apr 12 16:02:48 2026 -0400 seg6: separate dst_cache for input and output paths in seg6 lwtunnel [ Upstream commit c3812651b522fe8437ebb7063b75ddb95b571643 ] The seg6 lwtunnel uses a single dst_cache per encap route, shared between seg6_input_core() and seg6_output_core(). These two paths can perform the post-encap SID lookup in different routing contexts (e.g., ip rules matching on the ingress interface, or VRF table separation). Whichever path runs first populates the cache, and the other reuses it blindly, bypassing its own lookup. Fix this by splitting the cache into cache_input and cache_output, so each path maintains its own cached dst independently. Fixes: 6c8702c60b88 ("ipv6: sr: add support for SRH encapsulation and injection with lwtunnels") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Andrea Mayer <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Nicolas Dichtel <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Justin Iurman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> [ added missing dst reference loop guard in seg6_output_core() ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Oleh Konko <[email protected]> Date: Thu Apr 2 09:48:57 2026 +0000 tipc: fix bc_ackers underflow on duplicate GRP_ACK_MSG commit 48a5fe38772b6f039522469ee6131a67838221a8 upstream. The GRP_ACK_MSG handler in tipc_group_proto_rcv() currently decrements bc_ackers on every inbound group ACK, even when the same member has already acknowledged the current broadcast round. Because bc_ackers is a u16, a duplicate ACK received after the last legitimate ACK wraps the counter to 65535. Once wrapped, tipc_group_bc_cong() keeps reporting congestion and later group broadcasts on the affected socket stay blocked until the group is recreated. Fix this by ignoring duplicate or stale ACKs before touching bc_acked or bc_ackers. This makes repeated GRP_ACK_MSG handling idempotent and prevents the underflow path. Fixes: 2f487712b893 ("tipc: guarantee that group broadcast doesn't bypass group unicast") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Oleh Konko <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Tung Nguyen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Michael Zimmermann <[email protected]> Date: Sat Apr 11 21:47:15 2026 -0400 usb: gadget: f_hid: move list and spinlock inits from bind to alloc [ Upstream commit 4e0a88254ad59f6c53a34bf5fa241884ec09e8b2 ] There was an issue when you did the following: - setup and bind an hid gadget - open /dev/hidg0 - use the resulting fd in EPOLL_CTL_ADD - unbind the UDC - bind the UDC - use the fd in EPOLL_CTL_DEL When CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST was enabled, a list_del corruption was reported within remove_wait_queue (via ep_remove_wait_queue). After some debugging I found out that the queues, which f_hid registers via poll_wait were the problem. These were initialized using init_waitqueue_head inside hidg_bind. So effectively, the bind function re-initialized the queues while there were still items in them. The solution is to move the initialization from hidg_bind to hidg_alloc to extend their lifetimes to the lifetime of the function instance. Additionally, I found many other possibly problematic init calls in the bind function, which I moved as well. Signed-off-by: Michael Zimmermann <[email protected]> Cc: stable <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Kuen-Han Tsai <[email protected]> Date: Sat Apr 11 10:11:18 2026 -0400 usb: gadget: u_ether: Fix race between gether_disconnect and eth_stop [ Upstream commit e1eabb072c75681f78312c484ccfffb7430f206e ] A race condition between gether_disconnect() and eth_stop() leads to a NULL pointer dereference. Specifically, if eth_stop() is triggered concurrently while gether_disconnect() is tearing down the endpoints, eth_stop() attempts to access the cleared endpoint descriptor, causing the following NPE: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference Call trace: __dwc3_gadget_ep_enable+0x60/0x788 dwc3_gadget_ep_enable+0x70/0xe4 usb_ep_enable+0x60/0x15c eth_stop+0xb8/0x108 Because eth_stop() crashes while holding the dev->lock, the thread running gether_disconnect() fails to acquire the same lock and spins forever, resulting in a hardlockup: Core - Debugging Information for Hardlockup core(7) Call trace: queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x94/0x488 _raw_spin_lock+0x64/0x6c gether_disconnect+0x19c/0x1e8 ncm_set_alt+0x68/0x1a0 composite_setup+0x6a0/0xc50 The root cause is that the clearing of dev->port_usb in gether_disconnect() is delayed until the end of the function. Move the clearing of dev->port_usb to the very beginning of gether_disconnect() while holding dev->lock. This cuts off the link immediately, ensuring eth_stop() will see dev->port_usb as NULL and safely bail out. Fixes: 2b3d942c4878 ("usb ethernet gadget: split out network core") Cc: stable <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kuen-Han Tsai <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Thomas Fourier <[email protected]> Date: Wed Feb 18 14:07:37 2026 +0100 wifi: brcmsmac: Fix dma_free_coherent() size commit 12cd7632757a54ce586e36040210b1a738a0fc53 upstream. dma_alloc_consistent() may change the size to align it. The new size is saved in alloced. Change the free size to match the allocation size. Fixes: 5b435de0d786 ("net: wireless: add brcm80211 drivers") Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Fourier <[email protected]> Acked-by: Arend van Spriel <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Johan Hovold <[email protected]> Date: Fri Mar 27 12:32:19 2026 +0100 wifi: rt2x00usb: fix devres lifetime commit 25369b22223d1c56e42a0cd4ac9137349d5a898e upstream. USB drivers bind to USB interfaces and any device managed resources should have their lifetime tied to the interface rather than parent USB device. This avoids issues like memory leaks when drivers are unbound without their devices being physically disconnected (e.g. on probe deferral or configuration changes). Fix the USB anchor lifetime so that it is released on driver unbind. Fixes: 8b4c0009313f ("rt2x00usb: Use usb anchor to manage URB") Cc: [email protected] # 4.7 Cc: Vishal Thanki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]> Acked-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> Date: Tue Apr 7 11:40:03 2026 +0200 x86/CPU: Fix FPDSS on Zen1 commit e55d98e7756135f32150b9b8f75d580d0d4b2dd3 upstream. Zen1's hardware divider can leave, under certain circumstances, partial results from previous operations. Those results can be leaked by another, attacker thread. Fix that with a chicken bit. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Yasuaki Torimaru <[email protected]> Date: Thu Mar 26 14:58:00 2026 +0900 xfrm: clear trailing padding in build_polexpire() commit 71a98248c63c535eaa4d4c22f099b68d902006d0 upstream. build_expire() clears the trailing padding bytes of struct xfrm_user_expire after setting the hard field via memset_after(), but the analogous function build_polexpire() does not do this for struct xfrm_user_polexpire. The padding bytes after the __u8 hard field are left uninitialized from the heap allocation, and are then sent to userspace via netlink multicast to XFRMNLGRP_EXPIRE listeners, leaking kernel heap memory contents. Add the missing memset_after() call, matching build_expire(). Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Yasuaki Torimaru <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Breno Leitao <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Author: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Date: Mon Apr 6 17:34:22 2026 +0200 xfrm_user: fix info leak in build_report() commit d10119968d0e1f2b669604baf2a8b5fdb72fa6b4 upstream. struct xfrm_user_report is a __u8 proto field followed by a struct xfrm_selector which means there is three "empty" bytes of padding, but the padding is never zeroed before copying to userspace. Fix that up by zeroing the structure before setting individual member variables. Cc: stable <[email protected]> Cc: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]> Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Cc: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]> Cc: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Cc: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Cc: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Assisted-by: gregkh_clanker_t1000 Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>